









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 





























Aid, Infrastructure and Growth 
by 
Sehlule Nontutuzelo Mti, Master of Commerce in Applied Economics 
University of Cape Town 





































In their seminal paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000) introduced the interactive term aid*policy into 
growth equations. Most studies up until then had merely added aid as a variable on its own with 
GDP growth as the dependent variable in order to check aid effectiveness. They were testing the 
hypothesis that aid, merely distributed, without other considerations, is not enough for aid 
effectiveness but must be considered conditional on policy. They claimed that a policy variable 
interacted with aid makes aid more effective. However, empirically, they needed to perform some 
manipulations to their dataset in order to achieve the required result. Subsequently, other authors 
have criticised the result based on other grounds and offered other variables as interactive terms. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2001) offer aid*policy*post-conflict as an important variable while Dalgaard et 
al. (2004) offer aid*fraction of land in the tropics as a good measure of aid effectiveness. This paper 
seeks to add to the literature on aid effectiveness by suggesting that infrastructure is as an, if not 
more important determinant of aid effectiveness by empirically testing the interactive term from it 
against the other terms offered so far. Aid*infrastructure outperformed most of the other 
interactive term, consistently entering with a significant positive coefficient in equations using world 
and low income datasets. Using the Africa dataset, aid*infrastructure does not perform as well but 
infrastructure itself gains significance while the policy variable losses it significance, whereas in the 
first two datasets, the significance of the two had been reversed. All this possibly points to the 
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In their influential paper, Burnside and Dollar's (2000) major finding is that aid is effective only in 
countries that implement what they see as "good" policies. They find this by adding an interactive 
term- aid multiplied by “good” policy to growth-equations. The finding by Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
that good policies may be a key determinant of aid effectiveness has been used as the starting point 
for assessing potential aid effectiveness by donors. Most notably the World Bank used the findings 
as a basis for their widely read publication Assessing aid: what works and what doesn’t (1998), which 
is the theoretical benchmark for their aid policies.  Other authors have criticised the Burnside and 
Dollar findings and offered other possible key determinants of aid effectiveness, adding them in a 
similar manner as Burnside and Dollar, as interactive terms. Roodman (2007) created a uniform 
dataset and tested seven specifications from what are seen as the main contributors to the debate 
on interactive terms. He found that most did not consistently perform well. It is proposed here that 
the interaction term of aid multiplied by infrastructure, may perform better and be a better 
determinant of potential aid effectiveness. 
 
The starting point here is analysing the effect of infrastructure on growth in general before assessing 
its importance for growth orientated aid. As shown in models below, infrastructure is important not 
merely as an addition to production functions as a measure of physical capital with a direct impact 
on output but indirectly through its effect on productivity.  What is tested here is its impact on 
growth as an interactive term when combined with aid. What is proposed here is that aid 
effectiveness is determined among other things by the infrastructure in place in a given country. 
 
The channel through which infrastructure becomes a determinant of aid effectiveness may be 
through the concept of absorptive capacity. Bhagwati and Eckaus (1970) have already pointed out a 















recent literature on absorptive capacity has however focused on the dearth of human capital or low 
policy as a constraint on aid effectiveness with very few studies looking at the impact of a dearth of 
infrastructure. Roodman (2006) for example, looks at the proliferation of aid projects and how 
limited human capital may lead to decreasing marginal returns when it becomes an administrative 
burden which reduces government efficiency by taking too much time up in government ministries. 
He notes that in Tanzania, this situation became so bad in 2003, the government decided to declare 
August a ‘donor-free’ month i.e. work on filing necessary reports and other donor related activities 
would be reduced to a minimum in order for the government to be able to concentrate on forming 
it’s budget. Another way in which aid proliferation can affect growth is through the poaching of the 
few qualified people in government to work on aid projects/programs hence reducing the 
effectiveness of government.  
 
With regard to diminishing returns due to infrastructure, Clemens and Radelet (2003) draw the 
comparison between the effectiveness of aid in the Marshall Plan versus the general apparent lack 
of effectiveness of aid in Africa and conclude that lack of supporting infrastructure and an existing 
plan by aid recipients, makes aid less effective in Africa compared to the success of the Marshall 
Plan. After World War II when America doled out aid to countries such as Germany and Japan with 
seemingly great success. They mention examples for how infrastructure may be a limiting factor. For 
example medical aid effectiveness can be hampered if there are not enough warehouses. The impact 
of infrastructure for aid effectiveness has not, however been tested empirically nor tested as 
extensively as the testing for the importance of institutional, policy and economic environment 
variables on aid effectiveness have. Testing for the importance of infrastructure is done in this 
paper. 
 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) started the trend of adding interactive terms to aid effectiveness analysis, 















introduced their policy variable and aid*policy into growth regressions testing the impact of aid in 
good policy environments. A similar approach shall be taken here. The significance of infrastructure 
shall be investigated by adding the term aid*infrastructure to growth regressions. Adding it to 
different specifications shall help test (i) the robustness of the variable by adding it to different 
specifications of growth equations offered by other authors to see whether it maintains its 
significance; and (ii) how it performs when compared to some of the other interactive term offered 
in the literature thus far. 
 
This method of testing a variable based on its robustness in different specifications stems from what 
Roodman (2007) points out namely, “If Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds analysis is applied to the 
results of this testing, then a coefficient will be deemed robustly different from 0 only if it is 
significantly different from 0 in every test.”  Roodman (2007) notes that this may be extreme 
because it demands that a coefficient be significant in every specification but it is the basis of the 
idea used in this thesis that a coefficient must firstly, be significant in most of the differently 
specified regressions and secondly, that it must outperform other coefficients tested by other 
authors in order to have some significance. The regressions are further run on three different 
datasets: world, low income and low income African countries. This is for comparative reasons and 
robustness checking and is of relevance since the last two datasets represent countries that are the 
main target groups for developmental aid. 
 
In terms of methodology, almost the same uniform dataset is used as in Roodman (2007) with the 
inclusion of an infrastructure variable and another difference being the use of aid per capita instead 
of aid/GDP as used by most of the authors examined by Roodman (2007). Aid/income was used by 
authors such as Boone (1996) in order to distinguish between countries with fungible aid or those in 
which aid was not fungible. According to Boone, in countries with aid/GNI ratios of over 15%, aid is 















Other authors such as Durbarry et al. (1998) and Hadjimichael (1995) also use aid/income to 
ascertain the turning point after which aid becomes ineffective. Variables of aid/income measure aid 
dependence (World Bank 2004) and since the question is not whether aid is fungible, aid/income 
does not seem to be the best measure of aid to use. Further, aid/income came into use when 
extensive research was done into its impact on investment/GPD and savings/GDP which were 
comparable measures. It is argued here that in investigating the effect of aid on GDP per capita as 
most authors do, the comparable measure of aid per capita may be preferable. Further it shall be 
shown that merely changing the aid specification in an equation may at times give a different result 
for aid effectiveness so the measure of aid used may have to be chosen more carefully. 
 
In running the regressions, it is found that the only variable that invalidates the new 
aid*infrastructure variable is Dalgaard’s (2004) aid*fraction of land in tropical climate (referred to as 
tropics in this paper for simplicity). However, as explained above, this may be explained by the 
possible link between the two. Table 1 show regressions run using the aggregate variable for 
infrastructure and each individual measure of infrastructure as the dependent variables and fraction 
of land as the independent variable has a significant negative coefficient in every case. Links 
established by Acemoglu et al. (2001) shall be used to possibly explain this by replicating their 
regressions and including infrastructure in their regressions. It shall be shown that the reasons for 
the result may stem from correlation between tropical climates and infrastructure through the 
variable suggested by Acemoglu et al. for explaining the link between institutions and tropical areas. 
The variable they suggest to make the link is settler mortality.   
 
First a general literature review shall be conducted on studies of aid effectiveness before discussing 
the authors whose equations are modified in greater detail as well as a brief discussion on Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) as their paper pertains to Dalgaard et al. (2004), the importance of which has already 















theory shall be given before a literature review on the debates on the impact of infrastructure on 
growth shall then be undertaken in order to put infrastructure into context in general growth 
literature. The data and methodology section shall follow before a discussion of the results and 
conclusion. 
 
Lit Review  
 
Studies of Aid Effectiveness thus far 
 
Hansen and Tarp mention the different methodologies used to investigate the links between aid and 
growth. Firstly, studies have been done on macro and microeconomics level and as Hansen and Tarp 
point out, there is the belief that the findings on a macroeconomic level contradict the findings from 
microeconomic studies. Secondly, aid has been investig ted in cross-country and single country 
analysis for example in Aid in Africa by Devarajan et al. (2001) which shall be discussed below. Lastly, 
qualitative and quantitative studies have been under taken. 
 
Hansen and Tarp’s (2000) give an oft quoted history of empirical aid effectiveness literature. They 
divide it into three generations.  The first generation of aid empiricist used savings and investment 
as the dependent variables and aid as one of the regressors. The second generation merely added 
aid to growth regressions while the third generation introduced institutional, economic environment 
and policy variables to the growth regressions as well as aid when assessing aid effectiveness. At 
times, these variables were added as interactive terms with aid in order to show that aid 
effectiveness is intertwined with the quality of specific institutional, policy or environmental 
variables. This study takes its lead from these studies by suggesting that infrastructure is the main 
















Hansen and Tarp mention that first generation studies by pro-development economists such as 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) proposed that aid increases savings and investment one for one without 
taking fungibility into account. However, empirical evidence found that this was not precisely case 
because aid doesn’t always necessarily go to the projects it is meant to support. An example of 
fungibility is when, after receiving aid a government decides to spend more revenue paying salaries 
instead of in intended investment projects hence reducing the effectiveness of the aid. As Easterly 
(1997) points out, part of the rationale was also that an increase in aid in the form of subsidized 
loans would lead to increased savings in anticipation of countries having to pay back those loans. 
Loans were therefore especially targeted to countries with a lot of natural resources like Zambia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), Congo (Brazzaville) etc but this theory was rebuffed by 
the reality on the ground. 
 
Hansen and Tarp review empirical studies of aid effectiveness. They do a survey of studies where 
savings, investment and growth are the dependent variables and aid or foreign inflows are the 
independent variables. When it comes to aid, of the 24 studies conducted on savings, 10 revealed a 
coefficient on aid that was not significantly different from zero while 14 had a significant negative 
coefficient and only one study had a positive coefficient that was significantly different from zero. 
Regarding investment, of the 16 studies conducted, 15 had a positive coefficient that was 
significantly different from zero, one had an insignificant coefficient and none of the studies showed 
aid to have a significantly negative relationship to investment. The studies with growth showed a 
similar pattern to the ones on investment with, out of 64 studies, aid obtained a significantly positive 
coefficient in 38 studies, an insignificant coefficient in 25 and only one significant negative 
coefficient. All in all, the first empirical studies of aid showed that aid seemed to have a negative 
relationship with domestic savings, a mildly positive relationship with growth overall and a more 
















In terms of case study analysis, in Aid in Africa, Devarajan et al. (2001) build on their previous and oft 
quoted World Bank analysis on foreign aid, Assessing aid, which is based on the Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) paper which is discussed in greater detail below. In the Aid in Africa, a case study of ten 
countries is undertaken. They actually divide the countries into four groups- successful reformers, 
post-socialist reformers, mixed reformers and non reformers. The first group comprises of Ghana 
and Uganda while the second includes Ethiopia, Mali and Tanzania. Mixed reformers include Cote 
d’Ivoire, Kenya and Zambia while the last group is comprised of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). They continue to emphasise, following previous World Bank studies, the importance 
of policy variables in determining aid effectiveness 
 
 Devarajan et al. (2001) observe several differences between successful reformers and the rest 
which may be key to understanding why they were successful in making aid effective. Firstly they 
observe that Ghana and Uganda did not receive much aid until after they had formulated the 
policies they wanted to enact for economic growth and stability. They observe that both countries 
had undergone severe difficulties, with their economies in bad states when they finally sort the help 
of international bodies such as the IMF in order to bring growth and stability. As the authors state, in 
these economies, crises was key to reform. Before receiving large amounts of aid, as with Vietnam, 
which also considered a successful aid reformer, these countries received more of technical 
assistance than aid in order to determine what would be the best way forward for them. This was 
not the case with non performers such as Nigeria and the DRC for as Easterly (1997) points out. 
These countries received large amounts of aid in the form of soft loans thanks to their natural 
resource wealth and not based on their eagerness to reform.  
 
Natural resource endowments also seemed to matter in how countries performed as Devarajan et 
al. (2001) note that Uganda and Ghana were not as well endowed in natural resources as the non 















effective as possible. Another thing the authors consider is the type of leadership prevalent in the 
countries at the time of economic reform. They observe that countries that do well are ones in 
which the citizen are well informed and educated about the processes and go along and/or, as in 
Uganda, there was strong political leadership to steer the country to success regardless of the 
naysayers. They note that one of the problems in Zambia, a mixed reformer, was that as soon, for 
example, as urban dwellers protested against the removal of food subsidies, the president Kaunda, 
already facing opposition from within his own party on the reforms, eased off from the process in 
order to please the electorate. They also find that countries with newly elected governments also 
perform better which bodes well for countries with functioning democratic processes. 
 
Further, in case study analysis, Devarajan et al. (2001) note that there is the issue of the ownership 
of reforms with aid being less effective in countries were economic reforms were imposed from 
abroad without consulting the aid recipients and getting their input. Allowing them to drive the 
reform process with some technical assistance for consultancy but not as the main source of ideas 
seemed the better alternative.  The authors further point out that successful reformers are denied 
continued success on the same level as when they start to implement reforms and perform well 
because, when they start performing well, there seems to be a reduction in the amount of aid they 
are allocated. The first possible reason offered by the authors for this is that, as the conditions for 
aid are met, there is no longer an improvement in them and donors assume that once conditions are 
met, their work is done. Improvement being seen as more important than the maintenance of the 
good reforms enacted. In other words aid is too stringently attached to policy improvement 
processes forgetting that improved policy should also possibly be a condition for aid.  
 
Another possible reason offered for the aid reduction is that, as they start to perform well it is 
assumed that successful reformers will naturally begin to attract foreign private investment and 















from the case and that foreign private investment is not as forthcoming as assumed after 
improvements and that, though performing well these countries continue to need to support in 
order to continue to perform well. 
 
Roodman (2007) and the main third generation empiricists 
 
 Roodman’s (2007) conducts a robustness check on the main empirical studies on aid effectiveness 
as he sees them. By making slight alterations to the datasets, alterations that should not have a 
significant impact on the results of the tested authors. He makes a uniform dataset to better 
compare and also check whether the results obtained by the various authors were not just due to 
the particular measurement of the variables that they used that were different from the other 
authors.  He found that authors used different definitions of aid, different control variables as well as 
different time periods. As he points out, of the seven authors he replicated, without unifying the 
data, there were “three definitions of “policy,” three of aid, and four choices of control variable set” 
so no concrete comparisons could actually be drawn. He sets out to investigate whether the differing 
results on aid effectiveness have to do with the differences in equation specification or due to 
differing datasets, as Roodman states, “underlying regularities in the data or...fragile artefacts”. 
Roodman comes to the conclusion that aid effectiveness is not concrete based on the fragility of the 
“arbitrary” specifications given by the authors whose aid effectiveness variables lose their 
significance given a different dataset.  
  
The methodology used in this paper to check the impact of infrastructure, primarily includes taking 
the Roodman (2007) analysis a step further, by taking the uniform dataset and adding 
aid*infrastructure specifications therefore, the propositions of the main authors shall now be 
discussed in greater detail as these are the basis for the regressions used in this paper. Guillaumont 















first set of authors because their data is only available in 12-year averages which are not comparable 
to the 5-year averages used in this paper and the latter set of authors because, in terms of 
interactive terms, they add nothing new to literature pertaining to interactive terms. Unlike the 
other terms they discuss methodology i.e. ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) versus dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) and the main contribution of this 
paper is to the discussion of interactive terms and not methodology as such. 
 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) set out to investigate the determinants of aid effectiveness. They point 
out that there are numerous studies which include aid in growth regressions (second generation 
studies according to Hansen and Tarp(200)) but aid turns up with very little significance in a large 
enough number of these most studies. They therefore try to determine whether empirically this is 
because the policy environment of aid recipients has not been taken into account. They set out to 
create an interactive term of aid and policy in order to determine whether, when this variable is 
added to growth regressions rather than aid on its own, this variable comes up significant. In other 
words, whether aid is effective is determined by considering whether the policy in a country is 
“good”.  
 
Firstly, they create the “policy” variable. They identify three variables that they think are important 
for differentiating between a “good” and a “bad” policy environment. The three variables are budget 
surplus, inflation and trade openness. Burnside and Dollar (2000) decide to create the policy variable 
by using the weighted sum method. They run a growth regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
including variables that measure political stability, financial depth, institutional quality, regional 
dummies in the regressions and the three policy identifiers. They then use the coefficients on the 
policy identifiers as weights in summing the variables to create the policy variable.  Once they have 















whether aid is effective or not given policy considerations. Using the OLS their aid*policy variable 
actually has an insignificant coefficient which only become significant with the removal of outliers.  
 
Some of the criticisms lodged against the authors regard the fragility of their results and the 
formation of the term for checking the effect of policy on aid. The method of multiplying has raised 
some questions but has been generally accepted and used by various authors in order to check the 
effectiveness of aid based on their own variable of importance. Regardless of the many criticisms 
many authors have come to the defence of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and offered different 
specifications in order to uphold the fragile results.  
 
Among the defenders are Collier and Dollar (2004) who develop a “poverty-efficient” rule for 
allocating aid. This rule simply states that in the allocation of aid, if donors knew only two things 
about a country - the levels of poverty in a country and whether it had good or bad policies, donors 
should give money to the poorest countries, especially those with good policies. This rule is based on 
a marginal efficiency concept i.e. an increase in aid will be more effective in improving the growth in 
a poor country than in a middle-income country for example.  In order to investigate this, they 
remove ‘excess’ variables from the Burnside and Dollar (2000) equation, leaving only regional 
dummies, the initial log GDP and variables pertaining to aid and policy i.e. aid, aid*policy, aid 
squared*policy and policy itself. They use their own measure of policy defined as the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).  They drop aid on its own as they find it is 
insignificant in their initial regressions and after all the changes, aid*policy and aid squared*policy 
become significant. 
 
Collier and Dehn (2001) and Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) explore the rationale that, if growth is 
affected by shocks, aid effectiveness may also be affected by them. Therefore an interactive term of 















experienced shocks of some kind. The rationale for this is that aid acts either as a cushion or it 
provides a means to build infrastructure in another sector of the economy not affected by the shock 
if the shock is negative.   
 
Collier and Dehn (2001) use export price shocks as a measure of a shock to the economy. They 
propose that the cushion effect of foreign aid in this scenario may be that it reduces the absolute 
change in foreign currency inflows. They find aid*policy to be significant but their own interactive 
terms are more highly significant. They introduce their proposed shocks into the Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) equation, as shocks on their own i.e. negative and positive price shocks and then as 
interactive terms with lagged aid and again as interactive terms with aid differenced. They therefore 
introduce six new terms in total to the Burnside and Dollar (2000) equation. They introduce 
‘differenced aid’ since, as they state, aid cannot be perfectly synchronised with price movements so 
it’s better to look at a change in aid rather than aid in level terms.  
 
Collier and Dehn (2001) find that negative shocks had a significant negative coefficient and therefore 
seemingly reduce growth whereas positive shocks had an insignificant coefficient. The only positive 
shock variable that is significant is the change in aid*positive shock variable but they did not 
investigate this further. The level aid*negative shock variable is insignificant but the differenced 
aid*negative shock, which is the main variable of concern to them, is significant at a 1% level 
significance with a positive coefficient. With regards to the findings regarding the differenced 
aid*negative shock variable, according to Collier and Dehn (2001), this means that aid reduces the 
unfavourable effects to export prices. They therefore propose that aid should be allocated to 
countries that are experiencing negative shocks rather than using policy as aid allocation 
determinant. They point out that aid is not being allocated to countries experiencing negative shocks 
















Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) create an environment variable which includes shocks as well, and 
use this as their interactive term. Again, the assumption is that aid has a cushioning effect. As they 
state, “countries need some kind of insurance in order to avoid the interruption or collapse of the 
growth process (possibly leading to a lasting recession).” They create their environment variable in 
the same manner that Burnside and Dollar (2000) create their policy variable- by weighted sum. The 
four components of the variable stem from two types of shocks- climatic shocks and trade shocks. 
Reworking the Burnside and Dollar (2000) regression with the environment and aid*environment 
variable leaves the impact of aid*policy as ambiguous as in the original Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
regressions i.e. it is positive and significant in OLS regressions but insignificant when a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression is run. The aid*environment variable is found to be significant in both 
regressions. The authors therefore conclude that it may be that aid is more effective in vulnerable 
countries i.e. countries that have experienced certain shocks to their economies.  
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explore another hypothesis, namely that aid can help to reduce the risk 
of civil war. They therefore aim to show that an interactive term of aid and a post-conflict 
environment will have a positive impact on growth. They are advocating for more aid to be sent to 
countries that are coming out of civil unrest in order to reduce the likelihood of these countries 
returning to a conflict scenario. This is dubbed the “security-efficient” rule of aid allocation. They 
also claim that aid can be unusually productive in post-conflict economies due to the recovery of a 
destroyed nation. The post-conflict period is also specific- with three four year episodes after peace 
processes have begun, counted one after the other and depicted as the peace onset, post-conflict1 
and post-conflict2 episodes. Aid seems to be more effective in the second period i.e. the years 4-7 
which represent the first years of full peace, versus the first and last periods, the first of which 
includes the period in which war is winding down and the second, the next fully peaceful period. 















each episode i.e. aid*policy*peace onset, aid*policy*post-conflict1, aid*policy*post-conflict2. Aid is 
only significant given the variable aid*policy*postnflict1 which has a significant positive coefficient. 
 
 Dalgaard et al. (2004) propose that in order for aid to be effective, climate considerations need to 
be taken into account. They therefore interact aid and the fraction of a country’s surface area that is 
found in a tropical climate (referred to as tropic in this paper for simplicity). They claim that if 
according to Collier and Dollar (2004), aid should be given to poor countries with good policy and, as 
they find, there is a strong negative correlation between their climate variable and good policy 
(based on CPIA ratings), then the “poverty-efficient” allocation rule should be questioned. Indeed, 
using dynamic panel general method of moments (GMM) the authors find that their interactive term 
outperforms the Burnside and Dollar (2000) aid*policy term i.e. there is a strong negative 
relationship between their aid*fraction of land in tropics variable and growth meaning that, 
according to them, aid is less effective in countries with a large fraction of their land in tropical 
areas. In Roodman’s (2007) studies, this aid*tropic and Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) variable 
outperform the other variables when subjected to his robustness checks. 
 
The negative relationship between policy and climate is explored from a different perspective by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001). They explore and find that bad institutions may be related to patterns of 
colonial European settlement.  Given that the extent and pattern of European settlement affected 
the type of settlements and institutions Europeans established in the colonies, they propose, it 
would make sense that since Europeans did not settle extensively in tropical areas and they did not 
import and establish high degrees of western institutions that are essential in determining modern 
day measures of good policy to these areas.  
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) find a strong correlation between settler mortality and quality of institutions 















diseases, settlers did not settle extensively in these regions and therefore did not make a good effort 
of establishing western institutions that are associated with good policy in these areas. This, 
according to them, translates to modern day growth because, since they find current institutions 
relevant to current economic growth and find that settler institutions are persistent and can be 
observed in current institutions, there is  therefore  there is a link between settler mortality through 
settler institutions and modern growth. They conclude that settler mortality can be used as an 
instrument for current quality of institutions, based on the strong correlation they find between the 
two and they also find that it can be used as a variable in growth regressions, in place of current 
quality of institutions, in order to explain current GDP growth. This helps deal with the endogeneity 
associated with current institutions in growth literature. Later on in this paper, it shall be shown that 
infrastructure is also strongly correlated with settler mortality and therefore, institutions may not be 
the only important thing imported by European settlers that influence current levels of growth in 
former colonies. This link is not mentioned and tested by the authors. 
 
Another way of putting it, proposed by Dalgaard et al. (2004) is through the role of geographical 
climate may play in determining the type of economies that are established in countries found 
largely to experience a tropical climate. They mention that a lot of these countries have economies 
that are heavily reliant on agriculture and therefore climate is a better predictor of economic 
performance in these economies than policy therefore the climate variable may be a better choice 
for an interaction term than policy.  
 
The seventh paper tested by Roodman is by Hansen and Tarp (2000) and it differs from the above 
analyses in that it does not present a new interactive term for testing but questions the 
methodology used by the authors (they propose aid squared, already discussed by Collier and Dollar 
(2004) as their preferred term). By using a dynamic GMM estimation technique that takes into 















most of the other authors. They find, after using dynamic GMM, that aid squared to be significant. 
Aid squared is already taken into account by Collier and Dollar (2004) and since the emphasis here is 
on interactive terms, this paper is not replicated here. 
 
To summarise the findings thus far, Burnside and Dollar (2000) introduce the trend of using 
interactive terms and offer the term aid*policy as a possible measure of aid effectiveness. However, 
they find their own variable turns up insignificant unless outliers are removed from the dataset or 
aid squared*policy is included in the regression. They chose the method of removing the outliers to 
come to the conclusion that aid*policy is a significant determinant of aid effectiveness. Collier and 
Dollar (2004) add aid squared*policy to their regression in order to confirm the Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) result. Collier and Dehn (2001) confirm in their own findings that aid*policy is significant but 
they find that differenced aid*negative shock may be more significant. Guillaumont (2001) and 
Chauvet do not find aid*policy robust and find their own variable, aid*environment, to be 
significant. Lastly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find their variable aid*policy*post-conflict to be 
significant while Dalgaard et al. (2004) find their own variable aid*fraction of land in tropics has a 
significant negative coefficient. 
 
Roodman (2007) does something very important by running all the above equations on a single 
uniform dataset. Recognising that the results obtained by the various authors were obtained using 
different datasets hence making the results not particularly comparable, he replicates all the 
different specifications on a single uniform dataset.  Firstly, he uses an expanded dataset to that 
utilised by the various authors. Secondly, uniform definitions of variables are employed e.g. for aid 
some authors had used effective development assistance (EDA) while others preferred overseas 
development assistance (ODA) (difference discussed in the data section). He also used uniform 
periodization i.e. he had a dataset for four year averages and another for five year averages. These 















best after controlling for various variables or time periods and other tests, seems to be the Dalgaard 
et al.’s (2004) tropic variable, followed by Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004)  aid*policy*postconflict1 and 
the Collier and Dehn’s (2001)  variable doesn’t seem to perform too badly but Roodman (2007) 
states the all are sensitive to outliers.  
 
To further explain the reason for exploring a new variable and continued exploration variables for 
aid effectiveness, a quote shall be taken from the introduction to “Aid and performance: A 
reassessment” by Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001). They note, “Aid has been assessed [World Bank, 
1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000].The question raised thirteen years ago by Cassen et al. [1986] has 
been answered. It can work depending on the policies. If they are good, aid will be efficient, if they 
are not, aid will be useless at best. Aid should be allocated to those countries pursuing good policies, 
to a larger extent, it is argued, than is already the case. Aid effectiveness and aid selectivity issues 
are thus simultaneously solved. Coming after 30 years of academic work and political discussions 
and facing a resilient agnosticism about the effects of external aid on development [White, 1992], 
the new paradigm may appear reassuring. However it raises two basic and related problems: is good 
policy the only conditioning factor? Is it the single right criterion according to which aid should be 





Given the findings above, it is interesting to observe the determinants of aid allocation. Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) focuses mainly on bilateral aid allocation. After conducting empirical analysis, they find 
that aid has been given on political grounds and not based on economic reasoning. The evidence for 
aid being given on political grounds, for example, includes middle income countries such as Israel 















political reasons. Another example of this is that some countries, most notably Japan, seemed, 
according to the study, to distribute aid to countries that voted along similar lines with them in UN 
debates but this was not necessarily the case, for example, for the US.  
 
Most of the authors mentioned above run a regression in order to check the determinants of aid 
allocation. With aid as the dependent variable, they include variables such as policy, population, 
measures of political stability, regional dummies, some country and franc zone dummies and the 
variable of interest to each particular author. According to Burnside and Dollar (2001)most studies, 
including theirs, find that, initial income and population have negative and significant coefficients i.e. 
small and poor countries receive more aid. They find that their policy variable does not come up 
significant in their aid regression when aid is measured as total aid disbursements for low income 
countries. Empirically however, they find that when aid is analysed based on the source, policy is 
more significant for World Bank and multilateral disbursements than for bilateral aid disbursements. 
Collier and Dehn (2001) find that their dummy for negative shocks comes out negative in growth 
regressions while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that aid actually decreases in postconflict1 i.e. 
immediately after a war, aid is increased into a country after a conflict period but the aid flow begins 
to decrease after about 3 years, during the period when it is most needed i.e. when the country has 
begun to settle down and beginning to rebuild itself.  
 
Next, a brief discussion of the theory of aid shall be given. 
 
Model of Aid in Growth 
 
As Hansen and Tarp (2001) point out that empirical work has been touted as the main method to 
investigate aid effectiveness mainly because of the complexities of the interactions of growth 















frameworks.” However, a brief simple description, derived from Hansen and Tarp, shall be given 
here of the Harrod-Domar model.  As Easterly (1997) points out, the model is important because it 
still underpins a lot of the ways in which donor organisations work particularly the IMF. The Harrod-
Domar model uses a Leonitef production function and starts from the assumption that there is 
excess labour supply and that output is linearly related to capital which is seen as the scarce factor 
of production. Assuming the capital-output ratio, ν, is constant, income growth is therefore 
determined by the change in capital stock as shown in the equation below: 
 




  = income growth 
 = income  
 = capital stock 
If capital stock changes are related to investment and depreciation is allowed for then: 
 
           (2)
    
where: 
 
 = gross investment 
 = depreciation   





















= aid  
 = total foreign inflow 
 = private foreign inflows  
  = other foreign inflows 
 
Dividing everything in equation 3 by Y(t) yields the following equation: 
 
          (4) 
 
Assuming that aid has no impact on private or foreign inflow i.e. , the effect of aid on 
investment reduces to . This last expression establishes the link between aid and 
savings which was the main focus of the first generation empiricists. In general the Harrod-Domar 
model establishes that investment is needed for growth and that aid can work through investment in 
order to promote growth. As mentioned before, this model is too simplistic to accommodate those 
complexities of the interaction of variables in current empirical work. The Chenery- Strout two gap 
analysis, introduced later after the Harrod-Domar is seen as an improvement on the latter because it 
incorporates import capacity constraints and the capital-output ratio does not remain fixed. Easterly 
(1997) notes that in practical terms, donor organisations still use the rational based on the Harrod-

















Debates on infrastructure in growth 
 
Hall and Jones (1999) find that physical and human capital contribute to differences in output 
between countries with high outputs per worker and lower outputs by factors of 1.8 and 2.2 
respectively while differences in productivity contribute to the gap by a factor of 8.3. Recent 
literature has emphasised that infrastructure does not only affect growth merely through its impact 
via the accumulation of stock physical capital but its effect it has on productivity. As shall be shown 
in models below, infrastructure enters both through its effect on total factor productivity as well as 
an input to production.   
 
Estache et al. (2005) note that in the mid 2000s, only four papers had been published in the 15 years 
preceding their paper in which a quantitative analysis of the impact of infrastructure in Africa had 
been undertaken. Infrastructure has barely been mentioned in growth literature let alone in aid 
effectiveness studies. The lack of inclusion of infrastructure in recent literature is described by 
Estache et al. when they state that “Whatever the reason, the upshot was that infrastructure had 
disappeared from the radar screen of most empirical researchers working on the sources of Africa’s 
growth.” 
 
When aid projects were started in earnest after the Second World War, infrastructure was 
recognised as a key component of aid effectiveness. However, most recent papers on aid 
effectiveness do not include infrastructure. In explaining why infrastructure may have been left out 
of empirical work on aid effectiveness, it may be helpful to quote Estache and Fay (2007) when 
discussing the scaling down of the mention of infrastructure in general growth literature: 
 
“The recent history of infrastructure policymaking perfectly illustrates the negative 















up-phase is necessarily followed by a down phase, regardless of the importance of the issue. 
This happened to infrastructure. It never stopped being important, although to a different 
degree in different countries and at different stages of development. However, its standing 
in the agenda of researchers and policymakers has cycled through highs and lows in the last 
20 years.” 
 
They also state that several investment survey climates have found that infrastructure is needed in 
order to attract investment for growth purposes. They mention several studies such as Fay and 
Yepes (2003) and Briceño et al. (2004), which link infrastructure to growth and mention that there 
are some who reason that many low income countries are not growing at the same rate as rapidly 
developing Asian countries because they are not investing as much in infrastructure development. 
 
Theoretically, the importance of infrastructure may be seen in the modifying of growth models to 
explicitly take into account the different impact of infrastructure capital and non-infrastructure 
capital. Canning (1999) conducts a study on the impact of different infrastructure variables on 
growth and proposes the following model: 
 
         (5) 
 
where: 
 = output 
 = total factor productivity 
 = non-infrastructure physical capital 
 human capital 
 = infrastructure 
















Constant returns to scale are assumed and so the exponents sum to 1. Using this model to 
empirically test the effect of aid, Canning finds that of the three types of infrastructure tested which 
were electricity generating power, telephones and transportation routes,  the number of telephones 
seems to have the higher marginal return to productivity. 
 
Straub (2008) discusses another version of this model in which infrastructure enters twice into the 
production, firstly, indirectly as a total factor productivity enhancing element and secondly, as 
above, as another factor of production i.e. 
 
          (6) 
 
In this specification they account the “efficiency-enhancing externalities specifically linked to the 
accumulation of infrastructure capital” when it is identified as a determinant of total factor 
productivity in the term .  takes into account the services provided by infrastructure. 
 
Escribano et al. (2010) points out the several ways in which various authors have come to the 
inclusion that infrastructure adds to total factor productivity and hence growth. Firstly, they point 
out that Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) state that high allocations of capital may reduce the 
cost of the adjustment to private capital i.e. lowering the cost that private investors have to pay as a 
starting point by having to invest in infrastructure as well as machinery hence, lowering the logistical 
cost when private investment is undertaken and reducing “the cost of unproductive private 
investments such as electricity generators or boreholes and wells with more productive investments 
in machinery and equipment.” In a similar vein, they point out that Reinikka and Svensson (1999) 















investment in productive substitutes e.g. generators and led to an increase in more productive 
machinery and equipment.  
 
Escribano et al.(2010) state that Galiani et al. (2005) find that channels through which infrastructure 
improvements may work are labour productivity and the enhancement of human capital. With 
regard to labour productivity the things to consider include the impact of improved transportation 
from home to work which also reduces stress and leads to improved organization of time. Also, 
infrastructure improves the efficiency of human capital through the facilitation of better health and 
education and further, through the promotion of further investments in human capital. The authors 
state that recent studies show that improvements in transport and infrastructure may also lead to 
improvements in the export performance of a country. Straub (2008) also notes that infrastructure 
may contribute to economies of scale due to better transportation leading to better inventory 
management for example. If infrastructure is necessary for growth then it must also therefore be a 
necessary consideration in aid aimed at increasing growth. 
 
 Calderon (2009) conducts a study on the impact of infrastructure on growth in Africa and finds, 
firstly that compared to Western Europe and EAP7 countries (The seven East Asian countries with 
“miracle” economies- Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand), Africa has some of the lowest measures of infrastructure and that the gap 
between the regions is increasing. They conduct a 15 year studies of quantity and quality of 
infrastructure. After analysing the trends, they find that North Africa has the highest amount of 
stock in Africa, followed by Southern Africa with Central Africa lagging behind.  
 
Calderon (2009) points out that in the period 1991-1995, Northern Africa, Southern Africa and West 
Africa had higher quality infrastructure than South Asia but since North Africa was the only region 















quality than South Asia. Using econometric analysis, they find that infrastructure has led to growth 
in several countries including Botswana, Benin, Egypt and Uganda. They conduct an econometric 
study of growth in Africa, including the usual determinants such policy variables (inflation and a 
government budget measure); structural policies (education, financial and institutional quality) 
which are predicted to increase growth in the average African country by 4.71 percent while 
infrastructure development leads to a surge in growth of 2.26 percent.  
 
Taking the positive impact of infrastructure on growth and development as found by the authors 
above, other authors have pointed out that merely rolling out infrastructure projects is not a straight 
forward solution. Besides establishing how much infrastructure needs to be invested in for growth, 
some authors (Estache and Fay, 2007 and; World Bank, 1998) also raise the point that maintenance 
needs to be taken into account before rolling out infrastructure plans. In Assessing Aid (World Bank, 
1998) it is mentioned that US$ 2 billion was poured into building roads in Tanzania which fell apart 
due to lack of maintenance. 
 
According to Estache and Fay (2007), recent debates on infrastructure don’t only ask about firstly, 
how it impacts growth, who should lead investment drives and the levels of investment necessary to 
produce the desired growth rate but, they also ask the question of where it would be best suited to 
establish the infrastructure. One of the problems is that, for example, building roads may have the 
opposite effect than intended. For example, the establishment of transport systems remove the 
trade barriers for local business and Estache and Fay( 2007) mention that some, including Fanini 
(1983) point out that this may have led to the de-industrialization of the South of Italy. Given the 
possible problems with infrastructure, they point out that empirical evidence points out that 
















Another aspect that Estache and Fay (2007) mention is that the trends in infrastructure development 
have been towards private provision of infrastructure. Since the 1990s infrastructure was seen not 
so much as a good that the government had to provide. It was thought that for efficiency reasons, 
private provision of infrastructure would be the best route to go. As the World Bank points out, the 
assumption was that,  
 
“Global capital markets have the depth, maturity, size, and sophistication potentially to fund 
all viable investments and projects in developing countries’ infrastructure. That they have 
failed to do so, and that the flow of private finance to infrastructure has declined so 
dramatically in recent years, is a reflection of several factors—chief among them the impact 
of recent macroeconomic shocks, ongoing transformations in the global electricity and 
telecommunications industries, the weakness of local capital markets in most developing 
countries, and unfinished reforms needed in many developing countries to place their 
infrastructure industries on a commercial footing.” 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data 
The basic dataset used in this paper was obtained from the Roodman (2007) and is the same 
uniform dataset he used to conduct his studies. It is measured in 5-year averages, which is also 
investigated and reported by Roodman (2007) besides his predominantly 4-year average analysis. 
The reason 5 year averages are used in this paper instead of the 4-year averages is that some of the 
new data is was more suited to 5-year average manipulation. It is assumed that this should not make 
too drastic a difference to the results. The data range is from 1954 to 2001. The countries used in the 
study are listed in Table 2 below. Three datasets are tested, one representing the world dataset, 
another for low income countries and the last for low income African countries. The countries found 















convention used is that employed by the different authors- low income countries are therefore 
defined as countries with real GDP per capita below US$1 900 in constant 1985 dollars.  
 
Based on Roodman’s (2007) analysis, most prominent papers on foreign aid employ aid/GDP in 
growth regressions when testing for the impact of aid on growth.  The first change made to the 
Roodman (2007) dataset was to shift from the use of aid/GDP and use of aid per capita instead.  As 
given in arguments above, the World Bank (2004) recognises aid/GDP as a measure of aid 
dependence. Measuring the extent of aid dependence of a country becomes useful when one is 
discussing to what point aid should be increased. After running regressions using aid per capita, and 
assessing the impact on GDP growth per capita, it seems only then should one refer back to the 
papers rerun by Roodman (2007) in order to discuss whether increasing aid is a viable option to 
make aid more effective. It therefore seems more relevant to use aid/GDP only when discussing to 
what point aid should be increased and when assessing not merely whether it has an effect on 
growth per capita. Early studies on aid effectiveness were testing the effectiveness of aid through its 
impact on savings and investment, variables that were defined as being divided by a measure of 
income. It may therefore have been important to define aid by a comparable measurement but 
there seems no argument offered for why this may remain so, especially in light of the fact that the 
most widely tested dependent variable, growth, is measured per capita. Aid per capita is therefore 
the variable used for aid in this paper. The results section discusses the preliminary differences 
found between the use of aid/GDP and aid per capita. 
 
Moving from the measure to the definition of aid, there are two commonly used possible definitions 
of foreign aid, namely effective developmental (EDA) assistance and overseas developmental 
assistance (ODA). EDA differs from ODA in two main respects. Firstly it excludes technical assistance. 
Secondly, there is a difference in the treatment of loans with the ODA only considering concessional 















the grant element of loans into account and these loans need not be low interest loans but “near-
commercial” ones as well (Chang et al., 1998). Roodman (2007) notes that Dalgaard and Hansen 
(2001) finds that there is a high correlation between EDA and ODA. Roodman (2007) therefore notes 
that substituting either variable for the other therefore should not cause too much of a difference. 
ODA was chosen in this paper because of the ease of availability ODA per capita data  versus EDA per 
capita and given the almost one to one correlation of ODA/real GDP to EDA/real GDP found by 
Roodman (2007) - a correlation of 0.97- it is assumed that this will not make too much of a 
difference to the results.  
 
The other main variables include the policy variable used by Burnside and Dollar (2000). This variable 
is created by including three variables to the initial aid growth equation aid i.e. regressing GDP 
growth on the log of initial GDP, ICRGE, M2 lagged one period, dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and 
East Asia and the three political instability variables- ethnic fractionalisation, assassinations and 
ethnic fractionalisation*assassinations. Included to this basic equation are budget surplus, inflation 
and openness. The policy variable is then created by the weighting sum of the constant and the 
three policy variables using the coefficients of the policy identifiers.   
 
With regard to the budget surplus, foreign grants are included in the revenue section while aid-
financed projects are included in expenditure so according to Burnside and Dollar (2000), there 
should be no relationship between this measure of budget surplus and aid. Inflation is included as a 
measure of monetary policy. The openness variable is a dummy variable developed by Sachs and 
Warner (1995) where the criteria for a closed economy include any one of the following criteria: 
 Average tariffs on machinery above 40% 
 Black market premium above 20% 
















When Burnside and Dollar (2000) create their variable, the coefficients used yielded the following 
equation. 
 
Policy = 1.28 + 6.85*Budget surplus - 1.40*Inflation + 2.16*Openness 
 
The following equation was obtained and used in this study:  
 
Policy = 4.182 +8.189*Budget surplus - 2.01*Inflation + 1.012*Openness 
 
It was obtained using the world dataset. All three variables had significant coefficients. The same 
method, using the same growth regression without the policy or the policy construction variables, 
was used to create the aggregate infrastructure variable for this study. The individual components of 
the infrastructure variable are taken from Canning’s updated dataset on infrastructure (Canning, 
1998). Four infrastructure variables are used namely measures of electricity, road, rail and 
telephones.  Electricity is measured as the total electricity generating capacity in thousand kilowatts, 
rail is a measure of the total rail track in kilometres whereas telephone is the number of telephones 
while road is a measure of total roads in kilometres. 
 
When the regression is run with electricity, rail, roads and telephones all included, roads is the only 
variable with a significant coefficient. This is not taken as a reflection of the general insignificance of 
the infrastructure but maybe an indication of collinearity. This is a possibility since, when each 
infrastructure variable is added to the original growth regression on its own without the other three, 
all but telephones has a significant coefficient as reported in Table 3 below. Individually added all 
















Based on the coefficients of infrastructure components, the weighted sum for the composition of 
infrastructure were formulated according to: 
 
Infrastructure = 6.571015 + 0.0000147*Electricity - 7.31e-08* Telephones + 1.94e-06* Road + 
0.0000139* Rail 
 
The variables are in millions in some cases, probably hence the very small coefficients. In addressing 
the question of whether it is possible that in forming their policy variable, there may have been a 
misspecification, for example, by not including aid in the equation used to determine the coefficients 
to use, Burnside and Dollar (2000) state that, if indeed there had been a misspecification, this may 
have shown up as widely divergent coefficients being found on the their policy index in the various 
regressions in which it is run. A similar approach is taken here in discussing whether there may be 
misspecification in forming the infrastructure variable and as can seen in the results tables, the 
coefficients on the infrastructure do not differ greatly from each other. 
 
As stated earlier, different authors add different variables to the equations. Collier and Dehn (2001) 
add and export price shock variable. To create it, firstly they develop their commodity price index 
based on Deaton and Miller (1995) which gives: 
 
                    (7) 
 
Where  represents the weight of the item and  is the international commodity price of the item 
measure in cost, insurance and freight (cif) border prices. The weighting term is found by: 
 
















Where the additional variables, Q, stands for quantity and j is a subscript for a particular time period. 
The weight of a particular commodity is based in the value of all commodities, n. They identify 
shocks by differencing a series of commodity prices to make it stationary, removing predictable 
elements and normalising the residuals in order to identify the shocks. 
 
The most significant of the three interactive terms employed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) is the 
involving postconflict1. Their interactive terms are based on time periods: peace onset, postconlfict1 
and postconflict2. Peace onset covers the years during which civil unrest winds down and peace 
occurs; postconflict1 measures a period of several years after that, generally these being the years 4-
7 which constitute the first period comprised fully of peaceful years; and postconflict2 measures the 
period after postconflict1. Lastly, Dalgaard et al. (2004) employ a measure found by calculating the 
fraction of land of a country found in the tropics which is self explanatory. 
 
Other variables are included and are assumed to be exogenous i.e. they are not affected by the level 
of aid or shocks to GDP. Among them include, firstly, a measure of the efficiency of government and 
the security of property rights. This variable is the ICRGE and is based in the international country 
risk guide (ICRGE) developed by Knack and Keefer (1995). The next variable used in order to capture 
political instability, is ethnic fractionalization from Easterly and Levine (1997). This variable is found 
by Burnside and Dollar (2000) to be negatively correlated with growth. Also included is an 
assassinations variable, to capture civil unrest. An interactive term between ethnic fractionalization 
and assassinations is also included to further capture political instability. M2/GDP is included in 
order to capture the development of the financial system. It is lagged one period in order to combat 



















As explained before the starting point of this investigation is the Burnside and Dollar (2000) aid 
equation specification given below. As mentioned before, the variable of interest for Burnside and 
Dollar is their aid*policy variable. They therefore add it to a growth regression with GDP per capita 
as the dependent variable and measures of political stability, financial depth, government efficiency 
and regional dummies. The other authors whose specifications are investigated here also use the 
Burnside and Dollar equation as the starting point of their investigations before they start adding 
their own variables of interest multiplied by aid to create their own interactive terms. The controls 
are the same in all the equations for better comparison so, although originally Collier and Dollar 
(2004) leave out aid and instead add only aid squared, it is added because they leave it out because 
they find that it is not significant in their regressions and since it is found to be significant in this 
paper, it is reintroduced to their specification in this paper. Aid squared is also removed from the 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) controls. 
 
 In this paper the original Burnside and Dollar (2000) and the other different specifications used by 
the other authors shall have infrastructure and aid*infrastructure added to them. As explained 
before, this is to test the robustness of the infrastructure and aid*infrastructure variables by seeing 
how they perform when compared to a range of other terms.  
 
The basic equation Burnside and Dollar (2000) equation used to run an ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) is: 
 
      (9) 
 


















 = GDP growth per capita 
 = a vector of exogenous variables 
 =ODA per capita 
 = policy 
 
This is the basic equation and other authors have added their own variables to or modified slightly in 
order, either to support the Burnside and Dollar (2000) aid*policy variable or, to show the greater 
importance of their interactive term for aid effectiveness by showing the resulting insignificance, or 
reduced significance, of the aid*policy variable due to their alterations. The basic equation when 
their variable/s of interest are added therefore becomes: 
 
   (11) 
 
         (12) 
 
The  stands for any alternative interaction term that is investigated by the other authors. What is 
investigated in this paper is the condition of the alternative variable being infrastructure, adding it to 
the Burnside and Dollar specification as well as the other author specifications that include their 
variables and interactive terms. This is done in order to see how it performs and the effect it has on 
all the other variables in the equation. Firstly when infrastructure and aid*infrastructure are merely 
added to the basic Burnside and Dollar (2000) equation (9), the following equations are obtained: 
 
















         (14) 
 
Where the new variable,  stands for infrastructure.  Modifying the equations of other authors, 
including the alternative variables of those authors, the equation therefore becomes:  
 
           (15)
         
        (16) 
 
The details of the alternative variables employed by each author are given in the literature review 
above. The details of the compositions of variables are given in the data section above. Due to fears 
of endogeneity of use of 2SLS is suggested by authors such as Dalgaard et al. (2009). The possibility 
of endogeneity of aid, according to Hansen and Tarp (2000) stems from conclusion that aid has a 
negative relationship with income i.e. poorer countries receive aid. The two equations for 2SLS 
method therefore become: 
 
           (17) 
 
        (18) 
 
The regressors include ethnic fractionalization, ICRGE, assassinations, an interactive term of 
assassinations and ethnic fractionalization, M2/GDP lagged one period to control for endogeneity, 















Also included in the aid equation are arms imports as a fraction of total imports, lagged for one 
period, the logarithm of population and dummy variables for Egypt, Franc zone, Central America, 
(logarithm initial of GDP*policy), (logarithm of population*policy), (lag of arms imports*policy), 
(logarithm of initial GDP squared*policy) and (logarithm of population squared*policy). The choice 
of these variables is based on the original Burnside and Dollar (2000) replication. The alternative 
terms such as postconflict1 and negative and positive shocks are also included in each equation 
depending on whether the associated interactive term is included. 
 
However, when 2SLS regressions were run here, most of the interactive terms were dropped due to 
collinearity. This is because all interactive terms are treated as endogenous based on the Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) paper. After finding that treating all interactive terms as endogenous reduces their 
significance, Burnside and Dollar (2000) resort to using OLS. Further, Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
Lensink and White (1999) test for the endogeneity of aid Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests and find 
that the test statistics when aid is considered as endogenous, do not differ greatly when OLS is used. 
Most of the authors discussed here use OLS -Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2004), 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Collier and Dehn (2001) while Dalgaard et al. (2004) use GMM. Given 
these considerations, OLS is the method of choice in this paper. It is used for all the specifications, 
whether the original authors used it or not, in order to create some uniformity in the methodology 
for better comparison of the interactive terms.  As mentioned above, when interactive aid terms 
were treated as endogenous, most of them dropped out due to collinearity. Results for regressions 
where only aid is treated as endogenous are also reported however. Fixed time effects are also 
included.  Fixed country effects were not possible to capture using OLS as other authors also found. 
It is the reason, seeing this common problem, Hansen and Tarp (2000) employ dynamic modelling in 
analysing aid effectiveness equations but these do not allow for long-run relationships to be studied 
















With regard to Burnside and Dollar (2000), they conduct tests to allow them to treat their policy 
variable as exogenous. In this paper, infrastructure shall also be treated as exogenous. Firstly, 
Estache and Fay (2007) state that studies (Fernald, 1999; Canning and Pedroni, 2004) have been 
conducted into the possible two-way causality between economic growth and infrastructure and 
find that there is evidence of causality in both directions but in the long run, in the majority of cases, 
infrastructure induces long run growth. Further, the argument is offered that when it comes to road 
and rail for example, they are not easily changed and therefore in short time analysis, it is not easy 
for income to have an impact on increasing infrastructure in the short term. Since the question 
under investigation is whether infrastructure has an impact at all and not the magnitude, the 
assumption of exogeneity shall be employed. Further, the possible persistence of infrastructure 
makes it a candidate of exogeneity. As shown in Table 4 when average infrastructure over the period 
1950-1960 is regressed against infrastructure in the early 1900’s, the mid century infrastructure 
term is highly significant with a t-value of 42.60 and an adjusted R-squared of 0.96. 
 
Of the seven authors tested by Roodman (2007), two are left out form this study are Guillaumont 
and Chauvet’s (2001) aid*environment variable since their data is only available in 12-year averages 
and therefore would not be comparable to the other specifications. Hansen and Tarp (2000) prefer 
aid squared but within a dynamic GMM model. Since the emphasis in the paper is on comparing 
interactive terms and not methods and since Collier and Dollar already include the aid squared 




To begin with, most of the controls performed as expected in the regressions using the world and 
low income datasets. The political instability variables, namely ethnic fractionalization, 















in most of the regressions using the low income dataset while only the assassinations variable was 
consistent significant in the regressions using the world dataset. The measure of government quality, 
ICRGE, also performed well with a positive significant coefficient in most regressions. The regional 
dummies were also significant in most of the regressions, the one for sub-Sahara Africa having a 
negative coefficient and the one for East Asia with a positive coefficient. Initial GDP and M2 lagged 
had sporadic significance. Most of these variables had sporadic significance in regressions using the 
Africa dataset. Tables with the results for the controls are not included here but are available on 
request. 
 
Results for changing the measure of aid 
 
The first sets of results to be discussed are those concerning the difference between the use of 
aid/GDP and aid per capita as the measure of aid in growth regressions. Most empirical studies of 
aid use aid/GDP as the measure of aid allocation, whether it is EDA/GDP or ODA/GDP and these are 
the measures of aid used by Roodman (2007) with the denominator represented either by market 
exchange rates or purchasing power parity. Studies on aid effectiveness may come to different 
conclusions about how aid should be allocated and these conclusions may be erroneous if the wrong 
measure of aid is used.  
 
Firstly, merely adding aid/GDP or aid per capita to the basic growth equation without policy, 
infrastructure or and any alternative or interactive aid terms yields a difference. This is shown in 
Table 5 below. Aid/GDP has a negative and insignificant coefficient while aid per capita has a positive 
and significant coefficient with a p-value of 0.08. Aid/GDP may be important in determining whether 
increasing aid is a viable policy strategy but given the findings here it may be more important to do 
as Boone (1995) does and remove countries with aid/GDP ratios above a certain level before using 















fungibility is not an issue and therefore it was not necessary to include these countries in his 
analysis. Other authors that use aid/GDP do not make this distinction when determining what 
countries to include in their analysis when checking the effectiveness of aid/GDP on growth. 
 
The main results affected by the differences in aid definition use are Dalgaard et al. (2004), Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) and Collier and Dehn (2004). These results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 below. 
There does not seem to be a very clear pattern to how the differences are found. Using the world 
dataset, with regard to the Collier and Dehn (2001) equation, in their paper, as stated above, they 
introduce four main terms. In the replication regressions, using aid/GDP only one variable gains 
significance while, when aid per capita is used, three of their interactive terms which are lagged 
aid*positive shock, lagged aid*negative shock, differenced aid*negative shock, differenced 
aid*positive shock,  turn out with significant coefficients albeit with signs different from the original 
authors expectations.  
 
Originally, the Collier and Dehn (2001) find differenced aid*negative shock and lagged aid*positive 
shock significant both with positive signs. For the authors, this is significant because it supports their 
claim that aid is needed in countries experiencing negative shocks to the economy in order to buffer 
the effect. When the same equation is replicated with aid per capita, differenced aid*negative shock 
is insignificant whereas the other three variables become significant with different signs. Lagged 
aid*positive shock expectedly takes on a positive sign however, differenced aid*negative shock and 
differenced aid*positive shock are similarly significant with negative signs. In this paper, none of 
Collier and Dehn’s variables are significant when aid/GDP is used but differenced aid*positive shock 
is significant with a negative coefficient when aid per capita is used. In the low income dataset 
equation Dalgaard et al.’s term is negative and significant when aid/GDP is used while it is 
insignificant when aid per capita is used. In the low income dataset regressions, Collier and 















a significant negative coefficient when aid per capita is used- a different sign from that found by the 
original authors.  
 
 It is possible that given the differences between aid/GDP specifications and aid per capita 
equations, one may have to be careful in whether one uses aid/GDP or aid per capita. As has been 
stated, aid/GDP is a measure of dependence and is therefore more relevant when posing the 
question of whether an increase in aid is a good policy strategy and to what point.  
 
Results from the inclusion of infrastructure and aid*infrastructure  
 
The main and most significant finding are to do with the findings when infrastructure and 
aid*infrastructure are included. Firstly it shall be noted that following the convention set up by the 
other authors, aid*policy was also included in all the specifications and it hardly gained significance 
in any regressions before or after the inclusion of aid*infrastructure. Aid*infrastructure on the other 
hand performed well. When regressed using the world and low income datasets , aid*infrastructure 
has a positive and significant coefficient in every specification to which it is added except for the 
Dalgaard et al.’s (2004) specification where, however, it also causes their variable to lose its 
significance. Its inclusion leads to the loss of significance and invalidates most of the other 
interactive terms in the different specifications including invalidating Dalgaard et al.’s although it 
enters mildly insignificant in that equation where it achieves a p-value of 0.12 and its inclusion leads 
to the loss of significance of the aid*tropic variable.  
 
Using the world dataset, the inclusion of infrastructure and aid*infrastructure therefore leads to the 
loss of significance of Dalgaard et al.’s term; Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) aid*policy*postconflict1 
term; loss of significance of Collier and Dehn’s (2001) lagged aid*negative shock and differenced 















significance. Burnside and Dollar’s aid*policy and Collier and Dollar’s aid squared term are 
insignificant before the inclusion and remain so afterwards. In the low income dataset regressions, 
similar results are obtained except although aid*infrastructure enters significantly in the Collier and 
Hoeffler specification it does not lead to the loss of significance of the aid*policy*postconflict1 term. 
These results can be seen in Tables 8 and 9 below. 
 
As can be seen in Table 10 below, in the Africa datasets hardly any aid terms are turn out to be 
significant, including the aid*infrastructure term. However, infrastructure term becomes gains large 
positive significant coefficients in the Africa dataset whereas it exhibited small insignificant 
coefficients when the regressions were run using the world and low income datasets. Of further 
interest is that the policy variable also does a reverse turn, having been highly significant in world 
dataset equations and attaining insignificant coefficients in the Africa dataset equations.  What is 
also of interest is that the inclusion of the infrastructure terms also leads to ICRGE losing its 
significance in the low income and Africa dataset equations, particularly in the former. This implies 
that in Africa and low income countries in general, infrastructure may be more significant for growth 
than policy and institutional variables. 
 
In terms of the aid*infrastructure term, this is hardly surprising given the assumption that 
infrastructure helps aid accelerate growth through the productivity associated with it, since sub-
Saharan African countries have considerably less infrastructure figures (see Table 11 below), 
infrastructure therefore cannot be a strong determinant of aid effectiveness. With such low 
numbers compared to the rest of the world and the average low income country in general, it may 
be explainable why infrastructure on its own is needed and significant in low income countries in 
general and may not be available in enough quantities to add to productivity and add to the 
significance of aid*infrastructure in low income countries in general. Further, in the Africa dataset 















with the inclusion of infrastructure and aid*infrastructure whereas it had performed well and comes 
out highly significant in almost every equation using the world dataset.  
 
The measure of institutional quality, ICRGE, also loses its significance in low income and Africa 
regressions. The aid*infrastructure variable outperforms aid*policy using the world dataset and 
whereas in low income and African dataset equations, none of the aid-interactive perform well but 
infrastructure comes out as a more significant determinant of growth than the policy variable which 
is insignificant all Africa dataset specifications whereas infrastructure in significant in all including the 
Dalgaard et al .(2004) specification in which fraction of land in the tropics is insignificant before and 
after inclusion of aid*infrastructure and infrastructure itself. All this may point to the greater 
importance of infrastructure as a determinant of growth than policy and institutional variable. All 
the trends in the data are found when 2SLS regressions are used with aid as the endogenous variable 
as reported in Tables 12, 13 and 14. 
 
The insignificant nature of infrastructure in the world and low income regressions may confirm what 
Estache and Fay (2007) find that in places where infrastructure is already established, developing 
new stocks of infrastructure may not be as important as spending money maintaining it. They find 
this for North Africa, which they find would be better served by maintenance of existing 
infrastructure since it has a lot more infrastructure than other regions of Africa, increasing the 
quantity of infrastructure is more relevant they find.  
 
What is of further interest is that the inclusion of infrastructure and aid*infrastructure in the world 
and low income dataset equations leads aid to change from being insignificant in most replications 
gaining a significant negative coefficient in almost every replication after the inclusion of 
infrastructure. This possibly points to the fact that aid on its own may have detrimental effects. This 















many authors mentioned in the literature review. Interestingly, in this paper, when aid is regressed 
against domestic savings it is insignificant until infrastructure is controlled for and becomes 
significant with a negative coefficient i.e. aid may have a negative effect on saving. This result is 
shown in Table 15. 
 
Using Acemoglu to explain possible collinearity between infrastructure and fraction of land in the 
tropics 
 
It is significant to note that the equations in which it did not perform well consistently across 
datasets, are those containing Dalgaard et al.’s (2004)’s specification with aid*fraction of land in the 
tropics (tropic) variable  which also turns out with an insignificant coefficient . The phenomenon that 
transpires in the Dalgaard et al. equation may have something to do with the link between tropical 
areas and high colonial settler mortality in these areas and the possible link this has to the type of 
infrastructure that was subsequently developed in colonial regions. The link between tropical areas 
and colonial settler settling patterns is discussed extensively in Acemoglu et al.’s (2001). What is 
proposed here is for infrastructure to be added to several Acemoglu et al. (2001) equations in order 
to study the relationship between Dalgaard et al.’s (2004) tropic variable and infrastructure and why 
Dalgaard et al.’s et al.’s variable is the only one not that invalidates aid*infrastructure in the world 
dataset regressions, due to possible collinearity. 
 
Firstly, in order to establish the possible link between tropics and infrastructure, Table 1. below 
shows the negative relationship between infrastructure and fraction of land in the tropics when the 
aggregate measure of infrastructure is used as the dependent variable and then when each 
individual component (e.g. electricity, road etc) of the infrastructure variable are also used as the 















For all the dependent variables, the tropic variable achieves a significant negative coefficient. 
Acemoglu et al.’s finding may be relevant to help explain this. 
 
Hall and Jones find that institutions are important for growth. Acemoglu et al. (2001) find that settler 
mortality may be an important determinant in the formation of institutions. By modifying Acemoglu 
et al.’s (2001) regressions and adding infrastructure, it may be shown that there may be a possible 
link between infrastructure and the settler mortality variable used by Acemoglu et al.(2001) which is 
linked to tropical areas which are linked to tropical diseases which caused high colonial settler 
mortality.  It shall be shown by suggesting that in the Acemoglu et al.’s analyses on the formation of 
institutions, another step may added to their analysis  and that step may involve infrastructure.   
 
For data, Acemoglu et al. (2001) use Curtin’s studies of largely of non-combat military deaths in 
colonies to approximate for settler mortality. A lot of these military personnel died from diseases 
such as malaria and yellow fever, gastrointestinal diseases being the third highest cause of death. 
The rates were measured by Curtin (1989, 1998) in deaths per 1 000 soldiers and logged by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) in order that the extreme figures from Africa do not disproportionately 
impact the results. The measure of institutions they use is the risk of expropriation of private foreign 
investment by government. It is measured on a scale from 0 to 10 with a higher score means less risk 
of expropriation and therefore better institutions due to greater freedom.  
 
 Acemoglu et al. (2001) propose that settler mortality is important because colonial settlers settled 
in areas where there were low death rates and when they settled in those areas they imported and 
established the institutions from their countries of origin. The main influence of the colonizers which 
impacts growth today is the imposition of Western institutions that have persisted to this day. It is 
suggested here that infrastructure needs mention in this story either as an added determinant of 















infrastructure for their businesses and general comfort. It is proposed here that institutions are not 
the only important channel through which growth was affected by settler mortality or that they may 
be a channel through which infrastructure worked. Infrastructure is therefore be added to the 
Acemoglu et al.(2001) equations in order to show that settler mortality did not just impact 
institutions but infrastructure development as well and it may be through this channel as well that 
settler mortality gains its significant impact on growth. Acemoglu et al. (2001) propose the following 
link between settler mortality and institutions: 
 
(potential) settler mortality => settlements => early institutions => current institutions => current 
performance 
It is proposed in this paper that the link runs either through the following links more according to: 
 
(potential) settler mortality => settlements =>infrastructure =>early institutions => current 
institutions => current performance 
 
An alternative route leaving out infrastructure and jumping straight to the impact of infrastructure 
on productivity may be: 
 
(potential) settler mortality => settlements =>infrastructure=> current performance 
  
Explicitly linking this to Dalgaard et al.’s tropic variable the alternative channels become: 
 
Fraction of land in the tropics  => (potential) settler mortality => settlements =>infrastructure 
















Fraction of land in the tropics => (potential) settler mortality => settlements =>infrastructure=> 
current performance 
 
Either way, the importance of the infrastructure and not just the institutions established by 
colonisers, is taken into account. Institutions come about when there is something of value to 
protect. On the face of it, it seems difficult to form laws for something that is yet to exist and more 
practical to assume that infrastructure needs to develop before or in tandem with the laws that 
defend it. The aggregate variable for infrastructure used in the growth regressions in the modified 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) equations, is added to the Acemoglu et al. regressions. 
 
Several authors have taken geography into account when determining current economic input.  
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) finding that geography, instrumented by distance from the 
equator, does not have as significant a coefficient as institutions (instrumented by settler mortality) 
in determining economic growth but there is a strong correlation between geography and 
institutions. Sachs (2003) assert that geography is important and has a direct impact on growth this 
is because tropical areas experience, for example, high rates of malaria transmission, therefore with 
malaria instrumenting for geography, they find that malaria transmission has a significant and direct 
negative impact on growth. As interesting as these result may be for growth analysis, it is not the 
direct impact of geography on growth that is of interest in this paper but the issue of geography 
being used to instrument for institutions.  
 
Halls and Jones, for example, offer the explanation of differences institution in colonial settlements- 
they suggest that Europeans settled in places that were sparsely populated and had similar weather 
to Europe. Acemoglu et al. (2001) dispute this stating that the reasoning is not entirely convincing as 
the Western influence of the presence of the Belgians in the Congo could not on the face of it be 















explanation institutions developed due to patterns of colonial settlement with colonialists settling in 
large numbers then and importing institutions to areas where there was low settler mortality.  It is 
from this more widely accepted perspective that the link between tropical areas and infrastructure 
shall be investigated from.  
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) identify settler mortality as an instrument for institutions. They therefore add 
it to growth equations in order to represent institutions.  They use average protection against 
expropriation risks their measure of institution and use simple OLS regressions to check their 
hypothesis. With average protection against expropriation risk as the dependent variable, they 
regress it against settler mortality and find that their measure of settler mortality achieves a 
significant negative coefficient i.e. there is a significant inverse relationship between average 
protection against expropriation risk and the log of settler mortality. They also run a regression with 
log GDP per capita in 1995 as the dependent variable and average protection against expropriation 
risk as the independent variable and another where log of settler mortality is instrumenting for the 
average protection against expropriation risk. In both cases the dependent variables achieve 
significant coefficients with the former having a positive sign and the latter a negative sign.  
 
Infrastructure is run as an independent variable in regressions with average protection against 
expropriation risk and log of GDP as dependent variables, with and without measures of institutions. 
With regard to the first regression, this is also to see whether infrastructure can be a determinant of 
institutions. Secondly, with Acemoglu et al.’s measure of current GDP- logarithm of GDP in 1995- as 
the dependent variable, it is regressed with infrastructure and settler mortality. Any endogeneity 
with regard to infrastructure in this case may be dealt with by the fact that the data for 
infrastructure used is the average from 1950-1970 representing the time period in which most 















This time period is used as an assessment of the accumulated stock of capital established by the 
colonisers.  
 
To argue for the persistence of infrastructure, OLS regressions were run in this paper with current 
infrastructure as the dependent variable and a variable for average infrastructure in the years 1950-
1970. Current infrastructure is represented by the average infrastructure from the first 5 years of the 
1990s since there is more data in this time period than any later period. There is a strong correlation 
between infrastructure in the mid century and current infrastructure. As shown in Table 1, the 
infrastructure established at the end of the colonial period enters strongly in the regression with a 
coefficient of 1.36, a p-value of 0.00, a t-value of 42.60 and an adjusted R-squared value of 0.96. 
 
Results of Acemoglu regressions 
 
All this helps provide the link between Dalgaard et al.’s tropic and infrastructure by demonstrating: 
 
 Tropical areas => high settler mortality => little settlement => low infrastructure  
 
Modifying the Acemoglu et al. (2001) equations yielded the expected results. When infrastructure is 
used as the dependent variable instead of institutions or a measure of institutions, there is a 
significant inverse relationship between settler mortality and the establishment of infrastructure in 
the 1950s and 1960s when most colonial regimes came to an end therefore there is a link between 
colonial settlers and the amount of infrastructure before the end of their tenure. So it could be that 
the effect that settler mortality has on current growth is not just through institutions but through 
the infrastructure established by colonialist who settled in large numbers in areas where their death 















areas they settled in order to make their lives more comfortable and improve infrastructure for their 
commercial purposes as well. 
 
Another possible way to test this is to add both infrastructure and the measure of institutions- 
settler mortality- in an equation with GDP growth as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 4 
below, both variables seem to be significant determinants of GDP growth. Infrastructure established 
by colonial settlers may still be associated with current growth because of the persistence of 
infrastructure. This is investigated by taking the average infrastructure for 1950-1960 and using it as 
an independent variable with current infrastructure as the dependent variable. As can be seen in 
Table 4 below, infrastructure established in the mid century is relevant to determining infrastructure 
30 years later (infrastructure numbers from 1990-1994 was used for current infrastructure as data 
for this period was more readily available than any later period). 
 
Lastly, another link between tropics, infrastructure and growth may be indirectly through the 
current institutions variable used by Acemoglu et al. (2001). As mentioned, when average protection 
against risk of expropriation is regressed against GDP growth, it is positive and highly significant. 
When infrastructure from mid-century is regressed against current average protection against risk of 
expropriation, it has a highly significant and positive coefficient when it is the only dependent 
variable as well as with the inclusion of log of settler mortality, therefore possibly establishing the 
link between infrastructure and institutions. 
 
All his may explain why aid*tropics variable may be correlated with aid*infrastructure and may the 


















Conclusion and policy recommendations  
 
A summary of the main findings in this paper are: 
 Using aid per capita rather than aid/GDP presents differences in regressions on aid 
effectiveness and therefore it may need to be a consideration taken into account in aid 
studies. 
 Aid*infrastructure outperforms any other interactive term, including the Burnside and Dollar 
aid*policy term which is also added to all equations therefore possibly highlighting the 
greater importance of infrastructure in determining the impact of aid on growth. 
 The inclusion of aid*infrastructure leads to aid/capita consistently entering significantly in 
the growth regressions but with a negative coefficient. Whereas before the inclusion of 
infrastructure and aid*infrastructure, aid, as a variable on its own was not significant. 
 There is a preliminary link between infrastructure and the fraction of land in the tropics. This 
is found by modifying Acemoglu et al. (2001) regressions and adding infrastructure to them. 
This may explain why regressions with Dalgaard et al.’s tropic is the only variable out of five 
specification types (eight when counting Collier and Dehn’s (2001) separately) against which 
aid*infrastructure does not perform well.  
 In the Africa and low income datasets, the policy and variable for institutional quality, ICRGE, 
enter with insignificant coefficients with the inclusion of the infrastructure terms. 
The conclusion being drawn here is not necessarily that there should be an increase in aid aimed at 
increasing infrastructure but to merely point out that infrastructure represents a capacity constraint 
on aid because infrastructure increases productivity and aid aimed at increasing growth needs to 
take account of constraints imposed by a shortage of infrastructure based on empirical findings that 
















Estache et al. (2007) state that, “the initial source of today’s infrastructure gap is probably the failure 
to adjust to the evolution of the demand from the agricultural, industrial and services activities in 
the increasingly open African economies.” How this concerns aid is that many governments in Africa 
have historically experienced difficulties keeping their budget balanced and are influenced by short 
term concerns, such as salary payments, to forego public expenditure. Aid may therefore help to fill 
this gap however this does not mean that rolling out infrastructure projects wholesale by donors is 
the solution. That infrastructure is important for growth is not new and even though some papers 
come up with empirical results that are contradictory to the findings in this paper, which affirms the 
importance of infrastructure as important to growth acceleration, infrastructure is generally 
considered across ideological camps as necessary for growth. This paper merely provides empirically 
results for its importance with regard to aid effecctiveness. The question therefore is not necessarily 
about if it is necessary but how this can be implemented as a policy question.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998), billions of dollars were spent on road 
projects in Tanzania but some of the roads deteriorated faster than they could be built due to lack of 
maintenance. It must therefore be pointed out that stating that infrastructure is a necessary variable 
in growth analysis is not the same as suggesting that infrastructure projects be rolled out in big 
infrastructure building drives in developing countries. The development of infrastructure is not an 
easy thing. In the 1960’s, great infrastructure drives were established in but failed to lead to overall 
growth.  
 
One may argue that most of the projects were not completed and therefore the effect on growth 
could not be established. One may also argue that the method of infrastructure establishment is 
key- big drives by government and aid agencies without the involvement of the people only lead to 
white elephants that are not maintained by the very people they were meant to help. As Estache 
















“Politically motivated projects are likely to exhibit low (or lower) rates of return as their 
objectives are to bring in the votes rather than to maximize growth. This is certainly not 
limited to developing countries as evidenced by the controversies around “Alaska’s bridges 
to no-where” in the United States.10 Similarly, a recent careful attempt to model how 
investment decisions are made in France concluded that “roads and railways are not built to 
reduce traffic jams; they are built essentially to get politicians elected” (Cadot et al 2006 
p1151).” 
 
Further, as mentioned by Estache et al. (2007) another consideration is the change in the type of 
infrastructure needed. They state that in some parts of Africa, the emphasis moved from the 
importance of establishing networks in sparse areas and to establishing lower quality but better 
maintained roads in dense areas. However, the decrease in establishing roads in outlying areas was 
not matched by an equal increase in roads in more densely populated areas.  
 
One also needs to be sensitive to regional differences in infrastructural needs. Estache and Fay 
(2007) find that in Southern Africa (besides Mauritius and South Africa), the largest payoff to growth 
would be in the development of roads whereas they do not seem to have as big a payoff in North 
Africa probably due to the already established infrastructure there while West, East and Central 
Africa could gain greater payoffs in all sectors with Central Africa with the most to gain whereas 
North Africa could gain payoffs from the improvement of roads in the area- in general countries with 
large amounts of infrastructure would benefit from improvements infrastructure whereas those 
with low figures would benefit from development of new infrastructure. This may be compared to 
other findings such as Canning who finds that, of the infrastructure variables he tests, telephones 















countries would benefit from improvements in road and electricity and less so with improvements in 
telecommunications. 
 
It is suggested, given these considerations that, although policy was considered less significant in 
determining aid effectiveness in general and growth in Africa, the same methods offered by 
Devarajan et al. (2001) in implementing successful reforms in developing countries should be used in 
infrastructure projects. Firstly, reform needs to be performed where there is a strong desire for 
reform with steps and plans laid out. Technocrats in charge of reforms should have the strong 
support from government. Further, as with other successful projects, something could be taken from 
successful reformers such as Ghana and Uganda. Firstly, governments should decide for themselves, 
after a thorough assessment of their needs, what reforms or projects would best suit their needs 
before money is pumped in. This investigation can be done in consultation with donor countries or 
other countries that have been successful in implementing projects. Devarajan et al. (2001) point out 
the Ugandan officials consulted with their Ghanaian counterparts in order to form their policy 
strategies. There should also be a consultative process on the ground with the people in order to 
avoid the problems in Zambia under Kaunda when people rejected reforms. This consideration and 
strong leadership are needed to avoid the proliferation completed and half completed white 
elephant projects on the continent. As with policy, simply imposing reform in the realm of 
infrastructure development may not lead to the reform necessary- imposing policy reforms 
wholesale on governments has at times been ineffective and simply imposing infrastructure projects 
may have the same effect.  
 
Secondly, and possibly more importantly a point to consider is that, failed projects such as the one 
stated of roads in Tanzania may have failed because roads were being built to nowhere. Building 
infrastructure without the establishment of the industry to utilise it or clamour for its maintenance 















drives. Again, as mentioned in the last point, merely imposing industrial projects may not be the 
answer. What may be more appropriate are social business type models- factories built by 
communities with their interests at the heart of it and the profits accruing to them further 
encouraging efficiency and success of projects which is has been hard to achieve with government 
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      Table 1: The link between fraction of land in the tropics and infrastructure 
  Dependent variables: aggregate infrastructure, telephones, electricity, road and rail. 
 







city road rail 
      














0.04 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 
      Observations 664 1138 1351 925 1121 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Values in bold significant 
     p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
    standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
  
















































Table 2: Countries used in aid 
effectiveness studies 
  
     





























































































** Georgia Moldova 
Saint Helena, 
Ascension and 




Svalbard and Jan 
Mayen 
Benin** Gilbraltar Maldives Solomon Islands* 
Burkina 































l Guinea Malta 



















vina Greece Myanmar* 
Sao Tome and 
Principe* 




















































** Croatia Mayotte* Togo** 
 
































Territory Nicaragua* Tonga 
 Congo, 













a Iraq Norway Turkey 
 Comoro
s** Iceland Nepal* Tuvalu 
 Cape 

























Czec Zealand ** 


























Republic Kenya** Pitcairn 
































West Bank and 
Gaza 
Algeria* Kuwait Poland Wallis and Futuna 
     * indicates a country included in the 
lowincome dataset 
 ** indicates a country included in both the low income  


































Table 3: Regressions with infrastructure variables added individually 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 
 
     logarithm of gdp -0.97 -0.80 -0.90 -1.09 
 
0.02 0.13 0.20 0.00 
ethnic fractionalisation -1.20 -1.39 -1.02 -1.13 
 
0.23 0.12 0.20 0.18 
assassinations -0.28 -0.34 -0.30 -0.32 
 
0.39 0.30 0.19 0.19 
ethnic 
fractionalisation*assassinations 0.23 0.03 0.19 0.31 
 
0.72 0.97 0.72 0.56 
ssa -1.04 -1.71 -1.22 -1.49 
 
0.19 0.02 0.09 0.03 
easia 2.47 3.08 2.44 2.60 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
icrge 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.44 
 
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 
m21 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.03 
 




   
 
0.01 
















   
9.82E-
09 
    
0.31 
Constant 5.95 6.45 8.25 8.40 
 
0.09 0.14 0.00 0.00 
     Observations 454.00 455.00 550.00 529.00 
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.29 
Values in bold significant 
   p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
 standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
World dataset used 

























Table 4: Modified Acemoglu regressions 
    
Dependent variables: 
current infrastracture, 
democracy in 1900, 
average protection against 
risk of expropriation, log 
GDP (PPP) 1995 and 
"current" infrastructure 
     
      
 
infrastructure infrastructure democ00a avexpr avexpr 












     
      
infrastructure (average 
1950 and 1960) 
   
0.30 0.35 












 Constant 8.16 6.58 6.94 0.44 6.38 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      Observations 45.00 44.00 73.00 40.00 41.00 
R-squared 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.34 
Values in bold significant 
     p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
   standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
  democ00a- democracy in 1900 
    avexp- average protection against risk of expropriation 
   infr90-94- average aggregate infrastucture in period 1990-1994 
  logpgp95- log GDP (PPP) 1995 
























Table 4: Modified Acemoglu regressions 
   
Dependent variables: current infrastracture, democracy in 
1900, average protection against risk of expropriation, log 
GDP (PPP) 1995 and "current" infrastructure 
     



















  avexp 
   
0.48 
 
    
0.00 
 
infrastructure (average 1950 and 1960) 
 
0.35 0.30 0.07 1.36 
  
0.00 0.01 0.15 0.00 
democr00 
     
      Constant 9.20 6.00 9.48 4.42 -2.40 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      Observations 74.00 62.00 44.00 58.00 59.00 
R-squared 0.24 0.09 0.59 0.55 0.96 
Values in bold significant 
     p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
   standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
 democ00a- democracy in 1900 
    avexp- average protection against risk of expropriation 
  infr90-94- average aggregate infrastucture in period 1990-1994 
 logpgp95- log GDP (PPP) 1995 



































Table 5: Comparing aid/GDP and aid/capita using Burnside and 
Dollar (2000)controls 
Dependent variables: GDP growth/capita  
 






















































































 Observations 551.00 
 
538.00 
 R-squared 0.28 
 
0.28 
 Values in bold significant 
   p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
 standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity
World dataset used 




























Table 6: Comparing results of regressions using aid/GDP and aid/capita alternatively (world dataset) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth per capita 






























aid -0.23  0.00  -0.28  0.01  -0.34  0.00  -0.19  
 
0.39  0.93  0.33  0.81  0.43  0.86  0.48  
aid2 
    
0.05  0.00  
 
     
0.15  0.26  
 policy 0.84  0.93  0.75  0.95  1.04  0.99  0.88  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.09  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.05  
 
0.15  0.78  0.06  0.95  0.54  0.92  0.46  
aid2policy 
       
        infrastructure 
       
        aidinfrastructure 
      
        posshock 
  
-0.11  1.32  
   
   
0.93  0.29  
   negshock 
  
-2.44  -2.23  
   
   
0.09  0.04  
   Daidposshock 
  
-26.31  -28.61  
   
   
0.25  0.07  
   Laidposshock 
  
1.28  0.08  
   
   
0.09  0.07  
   Daidnegshock 
  
1.03  0.25  
   
   
0.35  0.84  
   Laidnegshock 
  
-0.70  -0.03  
   
   
0.12  0.06  
   postconflict1 
      
0.28  
       
0.72  
aidpolpostconflict 
     
0.12  
       
0.05  
pinstab1 
       
        tropic 
       
        aidtropic 
       
        Constant 1.49  -0.74  1.74  -0.02  -0.04  -0.55  1.78  
 
0.63  0.79  0.58  0.99  0.99  0.80  0.56  
Observations 369.00  362.00  296.00  361.00  406.00  391.00  369.00  
R-squared 0.40  0.40  0.42  0.44  0.39  0.38  0.41  
Values in bold significant 
      p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
    standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
   missing values indicate values dropped due collinearity 
















Table 6: Comparing results of regressions using aid/GDP and 
aid/capita alternatively (world dataset) 












aid 0.00  0.58  0.03  
 
0.90  0.03  0.22  
aid2 
   
    policy 0.92  0.97  1.07  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
0.80  0.95  0.55  
aid2policy 
   
    infrastructure 
   
    aidinfrastructure 
  
    posshock 
   
    negshock 
   
    Daidposshock 
   
    Laidposshock 
   
    Daidnegshock 
   
    Laidnegshock 
   








  pinstab1 
   
    tropic 
 
-1.02  -1.38  
  
0.01  0.01  
aidtropic 
 
-0.70  -0.01  
  
0.00  0.05  
Constant -1.16  2.54  
 
 
0.69  0.42  
 Observations 362.00  364.00  357.00  
R-squared 0.41  0.43  0.43  
Values in bold significant 
  p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
standard errors and therefore p-values robust to 
heteroskedasticity 
















Table 7: Comparing results of regressions using aid/GDP and aid/capita alternatively (low income dataset) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth per capita 






















aid -0.08  0.00  -0.18  0.03  0.13  0.03  
 
0.79  0.86  0.61  0.24  0.76  0.20  
aid2 
    
0.00  -0.25  
     
0.93  0.41  
policy 1.18  1.01  0.98  1.07  1.18  0.99  
 
0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.01  0.00  0.06  0.00  -0.03  0.00  
 
0.88  0.99  0.51  0.45  0.65  0.69  
infrastructure 
      
       aid/capita*infrastructure 
     
       posshock 
  
1.26  3.27  
  
   
0.33  0.07  
  negshock 
  
-0.06  -0.37  
  
   
0.98  0.87  
  Daidposshock 
  
10.00  -35.41  
  
   
0.72  0.04  
  Laidposshock 
  
0.55  -0.04  
  
   
0.53  0.61  
  Daidnegshock 
  
0.30  0.90  
  
   
0.89  0.24  
  Laidnegshock 
  
-0.90  -0.06  
  
   
0.05  0.12  
  postconflict1 
      
       aidpolpostconflict 
     
       pinstab1 
      
       tropic 
      
       aidtropic 
      
       Constant 0.69  -1.46  3.91  -1.20  -0.23  -1.60  
 
0.85  0.60  0.37  0.69  0.94  0.54  
       Observations 240.00  239.00  192.00  239.00  262.00  258.00  
R-squared 0.44  0.44  0.47  0.47  0.40  0.41  
Values in bold significant 
     p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
    standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
  missing values indicate values dropped due collinearity 


















Table 7: Comparing results of regressions using aid/GDP and aid/capita 
alternatively (low income dataset) 

















aid -0.08  0.00  1.31  0.06  
 
0.78  1.00  0.11  0.14  
aid2 
    
     policy 1.15  0.96  1.22  1.07  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.02  0.00  -0.03  0.00  
 
0.83  0.79  0.67  0.32  
infrastructure 
    
     aid/capita*infrastructure 
   
     posshock 
    
     negshock 
    
     Daidposshock 
    
     Laidposshock 
    
     Daidnegshock 
    
     Laidnegshock 
    
     postconflict1 1.73  2.06  
  
 
0.01  0.00  
  aidpolpostconflict -0.04  -0.004 
  
 
0.48  0.05  
  pinstab1 
    
     tropic 
  
-1.25  -1.65  
   
0.06  0.01  
aidtropic 
  
-1.25  -0.04  
   
0.10  0.28  
Constant 0.44  -0.91  2.42  1.35  
 
0.90  0.73  0.51  0.65  
     Observations 240.00  239.00  239.00  238.00  
R-squared 0.45  0.46  0.47  0.47  
Values in bold significant 
   p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
  standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 


















Table 8: Coefficients on relevant terms before and after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using OLS (world) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 







Burnside and Dollar 














Collier and Dollar 
aid/capita and 
aid/capita*infrastructure 
icrge 0.32  0.36  0.34  0.34  0.33  0.40  
 
0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.00  
aid 0.00  -1.68  0.01  -1.75  0.00  -1.65  
 
0.93  0.03  0.81  0.04  0.86  0.02  
aid2 
    
0.00  0.00  
     
0.26  0.57  
policy 0.93  0.76  0.95  0.67  0.99  0.78  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
 
0.78  0.23  0.95  0.02  0.92  0.53  
aid2policy 
      


























1.32  0.83  
  
   
0.29  0.45  
  negshock 
  
-2.23  -2.38  
  
   
0.04  0.05  
  Daidposshock 
  
-28.61  38.99  
  
   
0.07  0.03  
  Laidposshock 
  
0.08  0.09  
  
   
0.07  0.01  
  Daidnegshock 
  
0.25  -0.05  
  
   
0.84  0.98  
  Laidnegshock 
  
-0.03  -0.03  
  
   
0.06  0.10  
  postconflict1 
      
       aidpolpostconflict 
     
       tropic 
      
       aidtropic 
      
       Constant -0.74  -1.28  -0.02  -1.82  -0.55  0.39  
 
0.79  0.74  0.99  0.66  0.80  0.91  
Observations 362.00  268.00  361.00  267.00  391.00  282.00  
R-squared 0.40  0.45  0.44  0.48  0.38  0.42  
Values in bold significant 
     p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
    standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
  missing values indicate values dropped due collinearity 















Table 8: Coefficients on relevant terms before and after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure 
using OLS (world) 








Collier and Hoeffler 








icrge 0.32  0.39  0.36  0.41  
 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
aid 0.00  -1.80  0.03  -1.29  
 
0.90  0.03  0.22  0.12  
aid2 
    
     policy 0.92  0.74  1.07  0.84  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
0.80  0.22  0.55  0.77  
aid2policy 
    

















    
     negshock 
    
     Daidposshock 
    
     Laidposshock 
    
     Daidnegshock 
    
     Laidnegshock 
    
     postconflict1 0.50  1.69  
  
 
0.51  0.35  
  aidpolpostconflict 0.00  -0.02  
  
 
0.06  0.37  
  tropic 
  
-1.38  -1.45  
   
0.01  0.00  
aidtropic 
  
-0.01  -0.01  
   
0.05  0.51  




0.69  0.99  
 
0.80  
Observations 362.00  268.00  357.00  263.00  
R-squared 0.41  0.46  0.43  0.49  
Values in bold significant 
   p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
  standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
















Table 9: Coefficients on relevant terms before and  
   after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using OLS (low income) 
  Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 



















Collier and Dollar using 
aid/capita*infrastructure 
icrge 0.35  0.21  0.35  0.26  0.39  0.30  
 
0.03  0.27  0.06  0.21  0.01  0.11  
aid 0.00  -2.38  0.03  -2.62  0.03  -2.44  
 
0.86  0.05  0.24  0.06  0.20  0.03  
aid2 
    
-0.25  0.00  
     
0.41  0.40  
policy 1.01  1.13  1.07  0.86  0.99  1.07  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
 



























3.27  2.54  
  
   
0.07  0.25  
  negshock 
  
-0.37  1.19  
  
   
0.87  0.66  
  Daidposshock 
  
-35.41  66.14  
  
   
0.04  0.01  
  Laidposshock 
  
-0.04  -0.07  
  
   
0.61  0.51  
  Daidnegshock 
  
0.90  -0.16  
  
   
0.24  0.94  
  Laidnegshock 
  
-0.06  -0.09  
  
   
0.12  0.04  
  postconflict1 
      
       aidpolpostconflict 
     
       tropic 
      
       aidtropic 
      
       Constant -1.46  2.46  -1.20  4.84  -1.60  0.24  
 
0.60  0.66  0.69  0.50  0.54  0.97  
Observations 239.00  182.00  239.00  182.00  258.00  194.00  
R-squared 0.44  0.48  0.47  0.51  0.41  0.43  
Values in bold significant 
     p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
    standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
  missing values indicate values dropped due collinearity 

















Table 9: Coefficients on relevant terms before and  
 after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using OLS (low income) 















icrge 0.37  0.28  0.35  0.19  
 
0.20  0.15  0.02  0.31  
aid 0.00  -2.66  0.06  -1.33  
 
1.00  0.02  0.14  0.33  
aid2 
    
     policy 0.96  1.08  1.07  1.19  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 


















    
     negshock 
    
     Daidposshock 
    
     Laidposshock 
    
     Daidnegshock 
    
     Laidnegshock 
    
     postconflict1 2.06  3.53  
  
 
0.00  0.00  
  aidpolpostconflict -0.004 -0.03  
  
 
0.05  0.00  
  tropic 
  
-1.65  -1.29  
   
0.01  0.07  
aidtropic 
  
-0.04  -0.04  
   
0.28  0.31  
Constant -0.91  5.17  1.35  -0.06  
 
0.73  0.42  0.65  0.99  
Observations 239.00  182.00  238.00  181.00  
R-squared 0.46  0.50  0.47  0.50  
Values in bold significant 
   p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
 standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 


















Table 10: Coefficients on relevant terms before and  
  after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using OLS (Africa) 
  Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 


















icrge 0.46  0.53  0.43  0.49  0.32  
 
0.09  0.21  0.25  0.29  0.20  
aid 0.02  1.06  0.03  2.13  0.02  
 
0.12  0.64  0.01  0.34  0.75  
aid2 
    
0.00  
     
0.73  
policy 0.72  0.94  0.62  0.85  0.93  
 
0.00  0.28  0.11  0.40  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  
 
0.19  0.39  0.05  0.38  0.95  
aid2policy 
     




















4.71  1.56  
 
   
0.11  0.82  
 negshock 
  
5.13  4.76  
 
   





   
0.00  
  Laidposshock 
  
-0.15  -0.30  
 
   
0.57  0.58  
 Daidnegshock 
  
-1.43  -2.54  
 
   
0.68  0.39  
 Laidnegshock 
  
-0.14  -0.16  
 
   
0.07  0.05  
 postconflict1 
     
      aidpolpostconflict 
    
      tropic 
     
      aidtropic 
     
      Constant -0.70  -159.18  0.82  -161.97  5.97  
 
0.86  0.00  0.83  0.01  0.09  
Observations 100.00  75.00  100.00  75.00  105.00  
R-squared 0.45  0.48  0.51  0.52  0.41  
Values in bold significant 
    p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
   standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
 missing values indicate values dropped due collinearity 















Table 10: Coefficients on relevant terms before and 
 after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using OLS (Africa) 
 Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 
  
 














Dalgaard et al. using 
aid/capita*infrastructure 
icrge 0.48  0.53  0.53  0.45  0.45  
 
0.19  0.09  0.24  0.10  0.30  
aid 1.85  0.03  0.60  0.33  0.76  
 
0.28  0.02  0.81  0.03  0.75  
aid2 0.00  
    
 
0.43  
    policy 0.72  0.61  0.93  1.00  1.48  
 
0.44  0.02  0.30  0.00  0.15  
aidpolicy 0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
 
0.32  0.19  0.41  0.10  0.60  
aid2policy 
     























     
      negshock 
     
      Daidposshock 
    
      Laidposshock 
    
      Daidnegshock 
    
      Laidnegshock 
    
      postconflict1 
 
2.96  3.13  
  
  
0.00  0.01  
  aidpolpostconflict 0.01  -1.13  
  
  
0.91  0.68  
  tropic 
   
7.86  7.47  
    
0.57  0.68  
aidtropic 
   
-0.32  -0.28  
    
0.04  0.17  
Constant -188.29  0.36  -127.90  -6.62  -128.89  
 
0.01  0.92  0.02  0.64  0.00  
Observations 79.00  100.00  75.00  100.00  75.00  
R-squared 0.44  0.47  0.49  0.49  0.53  
Values in bold significant 
    p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
  standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
















Table 11:  Mean values 
    




Low income Africa 

















































































Table 12: Coefficients on relevant terms before and after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using 2SLS (world) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 



























Collier and Dollar 
aid/capita*infrastructure 
2sls 
icrge 0.33  0.39  0.34  0.36  0.38  0.45  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
aid 0.00  -1.73  0.01  -1.86  0.00  
 
 
0.78  0.05  0.66  0.05  0.25  
 aid2 
    
0.00  0.00  
     
0.11  0.38  
policy 0.94  0.76  0.96  0.66  0.99  0.76  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
 
0.85  0.27  0.98  0.12  0.11  0.34  
aid2policy 
      
























1.26  0.85  
  
   
0.22  0.49  
  negshock 
  
-2.22  -2.29  
  
   
0.20  0.22  
  Daidposshock 
 
-29.63  38.63  
  
   
0.14  0.31  
  Laidposshock 
 
0.08  0.09  
  
   
0.07  0.09  
  Daidnegshock 
 
0.32  -0.01  
  
   
0.79  0.99  
  Laidnegshock 
 
-0.02  -0.02  
  
   
0.42  0.48  
  postconflict1 
     
       aidpolpostconflict 
     
       pinstab1 
      
       tropic 
      
       aidtropic 
      
       Constant -0.68  -0.84  0.07  -1.14  -0.16  out 
 
0.77  0.87  0.97  0.82  0.94  
 Observations 361.00  267.00  360.00  266.00  361.00  267.00  
R-squared 0.40  0.46  0.44  0.48  0.40  0.45  
Values in bold significant 















p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
   standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
 missing values indicate values dropped due collinearity 








































Table 12: Coefficients on relevant terms before and after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure 
using 2SLS (world) 


















Dalgaard et al. using 
aid/capita*infrastructure 
2sls 
icrge 0.34  0.42  0.37  0.44  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aid 0.00  -1.84  0.03  -1.42  
 
0.98  0.04  0.19  0.13  
aid2 
    
     policy 0.93  0.75  1.07  0.82  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
 
0.86  0.26  0.49  0.61  
aid2policy 
    















    
     negshock 
    
     Daidposshock 
   
     Laidposshock 
   
     Daidnegshock 
   
     Laidnegshock 
   
     postconflict1 0.50  1.74  
  
 
0.53  0.15  
  aidpolpostconflict 0.00  -0.02  
  
 
0.07  0.32  
  pinstab1 
    
     tropic 
  
-1.39  -1.47  
   
0.01  0.20  
aidtropic 
  
-0.01  0.00  
   
0.19  0.79  
Constant -1.12  0.42  1.50  1.75  
 
0.61  0.94  0.52  0.72  
Observations 361.00  267.00  356.00  262.00  
R-squared 0.41  0.47  0.43  0.50  
Values in bold significant 
  p-values in small font beneath coefficients 

























































Table 13: Coefficients on relevant terms before and  
 after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using 2SLS (low income) 



























icrge 0.36  0.23  0.36  0.25  0.45  
 
0.01  0.18  0.01  0.16  0.00  




0.50  0.03  0.76  
aid2 
    
0.00  
     
0.53  
policy 1.13  1.13  1.18  0.88  1.11  
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  
 
0.84  0.83  0.74  0.28  1.00  


















3.16  2.21  
 
   
0.05  0.41  
 negshock 
  
-0.55  0.43  
 
   
0.85  0.89  
 Daidposshock 
 
-35.84  56.02  
 
   
0.10  0.25  
 Laidposshock 
 
-0.04  -0.05  
 
   
0.73  0.76  
 Daidnegshock 
 
0.98  0.07  
 
   
0.57  0.97  
 Laidnegshock 
 
-0.03  -0.06  
 
   
0.61  0.38  
 postconflict1 
    
      aidpolpostconflict 
    
      pinstab1 
     
      tropic 
     
      aidtropic 
     
      Constant 1.67  1.88  0.36  2.28  -1.07  
 
0.59  0.78  0.91  0.75  0.73  
      Observations 238.00  181.00  238.00  181.00  238.00  
R-squared 0.45  0.49  0.48  0.51  0.42  
Values in bold significant 
   p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
  standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
















Table 13: Coefficients on relevant terms before and  
after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using 2SLS (low income) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 
 













icrge 0.02  0.38  0.30  
 
0.04  0.00  0.08  
aid out 0.00  -2.57  
  
0.95  0.02  




  policy 1.12  1.08  1.07  
 
0.01  0.00  0.01  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
0.94  0.63  0.72  















   
    negshock 
   
    Daidposshock 
  
    Laidposshock 
  
    Daidnegshock 
  
    Laidnegshock 
  
    postconflict1 2.13  3.57  
  
0.02  0.01  
aidpolpostconflict -0.01  -0.03  
  
0.19  0.07  
pinstab1 
   
    tropic 
   
    aidtropic 
   
    Constant 
 
0.72  4.61  
  
0.82  0.52  
    Observations 181.00  238.00  181.00  
R-squared 0.45  0.47  0.51  
Values in bold significant 
 p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
















Table 13: Coefficients on relevant terms before and  
after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using 2SLS (low income) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 
 
Dalgaard et al. using 
aid/capita 2sls Dalgaard et al. using aid/capita*infrastructure 2sls 
icrge 0.36  0.21  
 
0.01  0.23  
aid 
  
   aid2 
  
   policy 1.19  1.16  
 
0.00  0.00  
aidpolicy 0.00  0.00  
 
0.73  0.72  
infrastructure 0.62  
  
0.36  





   negshock 
  
   Daidposshock 
 
   Laidposshock 
 
   Daidnegshock 
 
   Laidnegshock 
 
   postconflict1 
 
   aidpolpostconflict 
 
   pinstab1 
  
   tropic -1.73  -1.33  
 
0.05  0.23  
aidtropic -0.03  -0.03  
 
0.39  0.39  
Constant 2.77  -0.22  
 
0.40  0.98  
   Observations 237.00  180.00  
R-squared 0.48  0.50  
Values in bold significant 
p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
















Table 14: Coefficients on relevant terms before and after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using 
2SLS (Africa) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 


























icrge 0.45  0.53  0.42  0.49  0.35  
 
0.06  0.08  0.09  0.12  0.12  
aid -0.01  1.06  out 2.13  -0.03  
 
0.81  0.65  
 
0.40  0.59  
aid2 
    
0.00  
     
0.48  
policy 0.94  0.94  0.82  0.85  1.26  
 
0.03  0.20  0.07  0.27  0.01  
aidpolicy -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  
 
0.81  0.40  0.13  0.33  0.67  
aid2policy 
     




















4.68  1.55  
 
   
0.07  0.87  
 negshock 
  
4.95  4.76  
 
   
0.38  0.40  
 Daidposshock 
  
-60.19  out 
 
   
0.04  
  Laidposshock 
  
-0.15  -0.30  
 
   




-1.36  -2.54  
 
   
0.61  0.36  
 Laidnegshock 
  
-0.14  -0.16  
 
   
0.16  0.10  
 postconflict1 
     
      aidpolpostconflict 
    
      tropic 
     
      aidtropic 
     
      Constant -1.45  -153.36  0.74  -161.99  -0.22  
 
0.77  0.04  0.88  0.04  1.00  
      Observations 100.00  75.00  100.00  75.00  100.00  
R-squared 0.45  0.48  0.51  0.52  0.42  
Values in bold significant 
    p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
   standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
















      
 
 
Table 14: Coefficients on relevant terms before and after inclusion of aid/capita*infrastructure using 2SLS (Africa) 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 
    
 



















Dalgaard et al. using 
aid/capita*infrastructure 
2sls 
icrge 0.50  
 




0.05  0.08  0.06  0.14  












 aid2 0.00  
     
 
0.54  
     policy 0.85  
 




0.05  0.22  0.01  0.06  
aidpolicy 0.01  
 




0.25  0.40  0.36  0.56  
aid2policy 
      























      
       negshock 
      
       Daidposshock 
      
       Laidposshock 
      
       Daidnegshock 
      
       Laidnegshock 
      
       postconflict1 
  
2.55  3.13  
  
   
0.22  0.31  
  aidpolpostconflict 
 
0.12  -1.13  
  
   
0.62  0.65  
  tropic 
    
6.70  7.47  
     
0.71  0.70  
aidtropic 
    
-0.30  -0.28  
     
0.19  0.26  
Constant -206.77  
 




0.96  0.13  0.66  0.09  
       Observations 75.00  
 
100.00  75.00  100.00  75.00  
R-squared 0.45  
 
0.48  0.49  0.49  0.53  
Values in bold significant 
     p-values in small font beneath coefficients 



















Table 15: Savings and investment regressions   
Dependendent variavables: gross domestic savings and gross capital 
formation  














c 15.74 3.08 20.61 0.01  
 0.00 0.78 0.00 1.00  
aid/capita -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.03  
 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.00  
infrastructure  2.22  2.90  
  0.20  0.00  
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05  
Observations 987.00 521.00 884.00 480.00  
Values in bold significant     
p-values in small font beneath coefficients   
standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
















































Table 16: Countries used in modified Acemouglu regressions 











Papua New Guinea 
Armenia 
 































Burkina Faso Ireland 
 
Rwanda 











Bahamas, The Israel 
 
Singapore 




























Kyrgyz Republic Slovenia 
Botswana 
 
Korea, Rep. Sweden 








































Cape Verde Moldova 
 





























































  France 
 
Nicaragua 
  Gabon 
 
Netherlands 
 United Kingdom Norway 
  Georgia 
 
Nepal 


























Table 17: Regressions for formation of policy and infrartucture 
variable 
Dependent variable: GDP growth/capita 
 
    
 
policy infrastructure 
logarithim of gdp -0.47  -0.83  
 
 
0.15  0.23  
 ethnic fractionalisation -0.98  -1.42  
 
 
0.27  0.19  
 assassinations -0.47  -0.38  
 
 
0.02  0.30  
 ethnic fractionalisation*assassinations 0.44  0.24  
 
 
0.32  0.73  
 ssa -1.45  -1.74  
 
 
0.01  0.03  
 easia 2.04  3.18  
 
 
0.01  0.00  
 icrge 0.28  0.43  
 
 
0.02  0.02  
 m21 0.00  0.01  
 
 





































  Constant 4.18  6.57  
 
 
0.09  0.23  
 Observations 373.00  368.00  
 R-squared 0.39  0.26  
 Values in bold significant 
  p-values in small font beneath coefficients 
 standard errors and therefore p-values robust to heteroskedasticity 
World dataset used 



















Table 18: Data sources (Roodman, 2007; Burnside and Dollar, 2000)  
       
Variable  Code  Data source  Notes 
       
GDP growth per capita  gdpg  World Bank 
2003 
  
       




 Natural logarithm of  
GDP per capita for 








Assassinations/capita  assas  Banks 2001  Assassinations/capita 
       
Political instability, lagged  pinstab  Banks 2001  Simple of assas and 
revolutions/year 
       
Institutional quality  icrge  Polity Risk 
Services (PRS) 




 Revised. Computed 
as the average of the 
three components 
still reported after 
1997, dropping 2. 
       
M2/GDP, lagged one period   m21  World Bank 
2003 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa  ssa  World Bank 
2003 
 Codes nations in the 
Sahara as sub-
Saharan. 



















Central America  centam  World Bank 
2003 
  
Franc zone  frz  Burnside and 
Dollar 2000 
 Codes African 
nations in the CFA 
franc zone 
Egypt  egypt     
Budget surplus BB World 
Bank 2003; IMF 
   World Bank 
2003; IMF 
2003 










Inflation  infl  World Bank 
2003; IMF 
2003 
 log (1 + inflation). 
World 
Bank primary source. 
Wholesale price 
inflation 
from IMF used to fill 
gaps 








 Extended to 1998. 
Slightly 
revised pre-1993. 
Positive and negative shock  posshock and 
negshock 






based on underlying 































 Available values for 
1975– 
95 from Chang, 
Fernandez- 




on regression of EDA 
on 
Net ODA. Converted 
to 
1985 dollars with 
World 
Import Unit Value 
index 
from IMF, series 75. 
GDP 
computed like LGDP 
above 
Net Overseas Development 
Assistance/per capita 
 aid per capita  World Bank 
2010 
  
Dummy for end of civil 
conflict in previous period 
 postconflict1  Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004 
  
Fraction of land in tropics  tropicar  Gallup and 
Sachs 1999 
  
Arms imports/total imports 
lagged 





Electricity  eleav  Canning 1998  Electricity generating 
capacity, thousand 
kilowatts 
Roads  roadav  Canning 1998  Total roads, 
kilometres 
Rail  railav  Canning 1998  Rail track length, 
kilometres 





















Democracy  democr00  Polity III 
described in 
Gurr 1997 
 An eleven category 
scale, from 0 to 10, 
with a higher score 
indicating more 
democracy. Points 




(from 1 to 3); 
Competitiveness of 
Executive 
Recruitment (from 1 
to 2, with a bonus of 
1 point if there is an 
election); and 
C nstraints on Chief 
Executive (from 
1 to 4). Set equal to 1 
if country was not 
independent at that 
date. 
Average protection against 
expropriation risk 1985-
1995 
 avexp  Polity Risk 
Services (PRS) 
(1999) 
 Risk of expropriation 
of private foreign 
investment by 
government, from 0 
to 10, where a higher 
score means less 
risk. We calculated 
the mean value for 
the scores in all years 
from 1985 to 1995. 
In our base sample 
this ranges 
from 3.5 to 10. 
Log GDP per capita -PPP- in 
1995 
 logpgp95  World Bank 
1999 
 Logarithm of GDP 
per capita, on 
Purchasing Power 
Parity Basis 
 
